Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 10/08/2025
Date of Engagement: September 1st, 2025 - September 25th, 2025
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
13
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
2
Low
4
Informational
7
Securitize Protocol engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on September 1st, 2025 and ending on September 25th, 2025. The scope of this assessment was limited to the smart contracts provided to the Halborn team. Commit hashes and additional details are documented in the Scope section of this report.
Securitize Protocol is a digital securities framework where tokens are fully backed and governed by compliance rules. The TokenIssuer handles issuance and minting, while the ComplianceService enforces transfer restrictions, lockups, and jurisdictional investor limits using data from the RegistryService. Core actions such as transfer, swap, buy, and redemption automatically route through these compliance checks, ensuring every movement of tokens respects regulations. Governance is managed by the TrustService, assigning roles like Master, Issuer, and Transfer Agent to control permissions and upgrades. Together, these components create a regulated on-chain ecosystem for compliant tokenized securities.
Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce both the likelihood and impact of potential risks, which were successfully addressed by the Securitize team. The main recommendations were:
Correct the totalIssued handling in burn logic to prevent a permanent cap lock state where the protocol becomes stuck and no new participants can mint tokens.
Enforce wallet validation in issueTokensCustom to prevent issuance of tokens to unregistered or non-compliant addresses.
Halborn performed a combination of manual code review and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is essential to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation, automated testing techniques enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify issues that do not follow security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the assessment:
Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
Manual code review and walkthrough of the smart contracts to identify potential logic issues.
Manual testing of all core functions, including deposit, withdraw, repay, and borrow, to validate expected behavior and identify edge-case vulnerabilities.
Local testing to simulate contract interactions and validate functional and security assumptions.
Local deployment and testing with Foundry.
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
2
Low
4
Informational
7
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Permanent Cap Lock due to totalIssued not reduced on burn leads to protocol stuck and no one can participate | Medium | Solved - 10/03/2025 |
| Untracked Wallets from No-Compliance Issuance Can Break Investor Records Because checkWalletsForList Isn’t Called | Medium | Solved - 10/29/2025 |
| Bulk issuance enforces a single issuanceTime for all recipients, preventing flexible scheduling | Low | Risk Accepted - 10/06/2025 |
| Incorrect revert reason parsing in MulticallProxy obscures custom errors | Low | Solved - 10/29/2025 |
| Ineffective lock time condition in getComplianceTransferableTokens leads to misleading logic | Low | Risk Accepted - 10/06/2025 |
| Unsafe ERC20 transferFrom and approve usage in executeStableCoinTransfer | Low | Solved - 09/29/2025 |
| Missing Two-Step Ownership Transfer Protection in ServiceConsumer | Informational | Acknowledged - 09/19/2025 |
| Unnecessary dynamic array allocation in issueTokensCustom wastes gas | Informational | Acknowledged - 10/06/2025 |
| Potential Out-of-Gas Risk in getTokenBalances for Large Input Arrays | Informational | Acknowledged - 10/06/2025 |
| Incorrect Maximum Holdings Check Prevents Valid Transfers | Informational | Solved - 10/06/2025 |
| Inefficient use of dynamic array for fixed-length parameters | Informational | Solved - 09/29/2025 |
| Missing input validation in issueTokensWithNoCompliance function | Informational | Solved - 09/29/2025 |
| Incorrect Loop Variable Type in _registerNewInvestor | Informational | Solved - 09/29/2025 |
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Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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