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Background

// Security Assessment

02.10.2025 - 04.03.2025

RWA/RBAC

Securitize

Halborn logotext
← Back to Audits

RWA/RBAC - Securitize


Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 04/29/2025

Date of Engagement: February 10th, 2025 - April 3rd, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

13

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

3

Informational

10


Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Automated testing
  • 5. Risk methodology
  • 6. Scope
  • 7. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 8. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 8.1 Lack of cpi implementation for rwa-token/asset_controller/create entry point
    2. 8.2 Missing rbac enforcement for some instructions of rwa programs
    3. 8.3 Excessive authority for accesscontroller's admin for securitize’s use case
    4. 8.4 Update_fields does not enforce maximum allowed flags for userrole permissions
    5. 8.5 Rbac master role uniqueness not enforced
    6. 8.6 Withdrawexcessrent becomes unusable when admin is set to pubkey::default
    7. 8.7 Lack of checking identity_account and identity_registry for investor in some entry points of the identity metadata registry program
    8. 8.8 Redundant constraint on authorized_user_role.id in createuserrole entry point
    9. 8.9 Has_any_admin_flag lacks a unit test covering all roles simultaneously
    10. 8.10 Has_medici_flag lacks unit tests for multiple scenarios
    11. 8.11 Instruction discriminators are not validated for uniqueness
    12. 8.12 Updates to rbac cpi entry points for compatibility with rwa token programs
    13. 8.13 Unnecessary account growth in assignuserrole entry point

1. Introduction

Securitize engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their Solana Validator program beginning on February 10th, 2025 and ending on March 3rd, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repository rwa-rbac, commit hashes, and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.


The Securitize team is releasing rwa-rbac, a program that acts as a facade for all RWA-related programs, enforcing role-based permissions before allowing access to critical functions via CPI (Cross-Program Invocation). The Securitize team is also releasing rwa-imr , a program that extends investor data without bloating the IdentityAccount in the Identity Registry. It relies on the Identity Registry for authority validation, as all instructions execute a CPI into the IRP.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided 16 days for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.


The purpose of the assessment is to:

    • Identify potential security issues within the codebase.

    • Validate that all the requirements presented by the client are strictly implemented on code

    • Verify that all the necessary functions are implemented to be accessed through RBAC/CPI

    • Check that the role-based access control implemented in the RBAC program follows a secure methodology.


In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of some risks, which were completely addressed by the Securitize team. The main ones were the following:

    • Implement the creation of an AssetController through CPI when creating an AsssetAccessController.

    • Implement RBAC/CPI enforcement for the CreatePolicyEngine and CreateTrackerAccount entry points in the PolicyEngine program.

    • Prevent the AssetAccessController's admin to have the ability to invoke all RBAC/CPI entry point.

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual review and security testing based on scripts to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:

    • Research into architecture and purpose.

    • Differences analysis using GitLens to have a proper view of the differences between the mentioned commits

    • Graphing out functionality and programs logic/connectivity/functions along with state changes

4. Automated Testing

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with the detection of well-known security issues and vulnerabilities. Among the tools used was cargo-audit, a security scanner for vulnerabilities reported to the RustSec Advisory Database. All vulnerabilities published in https://crates.io are stored in a repository named The RustSec Advisory Database. cargo audit is a human-readable version of the advisory database which performs a scanning on Cargo.lock. Security Detections are only in scope. All vulnerabilities shown here were already disclosed in the above report. However, to better assist the developers maintaining this code, the reviewers are including the output with the dependencies tree, and this is included in the cargo audit output to better know the dependencies affected by unmaintained and vulnerable crates.

Results

ID

package

Short Description

RUSTSEC-2022-0093

ed25519-dalek

Double Public Key Signing Function Oracle Attack on ed25519-dalek

RUSTSEC-2024-0344

curve25519-dalek

Timing variability in curve25519-dalek's Scalar29::sub/Scalar52::sub

RUSTSEC-2024-0402

hashbrown

Borsh serialization of HashMap is non-canonical



5. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

5.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_eme​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EEE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_eE=∏me​

5.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_ImI​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact III is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}I=max(mI​)+4∑mI​−max(mI​)​

5.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CCC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rrr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (sss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CCC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rsC=rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SSS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)S=min(10,EIC∗10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

6. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: rwa-rbac
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 2d98c41
(c) Items in scope:
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/error.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/events.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/instructions/add_levels.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/instructions/attach_wallet_by_investor.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/instructions/change_country.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/instructions/mod.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/instructions/register_investor.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/instructions/remove_investor.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/instructions/remove_levels.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/lib.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/state/investor.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/state/mod.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/error.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/events.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/helper.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/admin/assign_user_role.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/admin/create_controller.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/admin/create_user_role.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/admin/delete_user_role.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/admin/mod.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/admin/modify_user_role.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/admin/remove_user_role.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/admin/set_lut_address.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/admin/update_controller_admin.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/admin/withdraw_excess_rent.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/asset_controller/close_mint_account.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/asset_controller/freeze_token_account.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/asset_controller/issue_tokens.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/asset_controller/mod.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/asset_controller/revoke_tokens.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/asset_controller/seize_tokens.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/asset_controller/thaw_token_account.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/asset_controller/update_asset_metadata.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/asset_controller/update_interest_bearing_mint_rate.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/identity_metadata_registry/add_levels.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/identity_metadata_registry/change_country.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/identity_metadata_registry/mod.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/identity_metadata_registry/register_investor.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/identity_metadata_registry/remove_investor.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/identity_metadata_registry/remove_levels.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/identity_registry/attach_wallet_to_identity.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/identity_registry/create_identity_account.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/identity_registry/detach_wallet_from_identity.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/identity_registry/mod.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/identity_registry/remove_identity_account.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/mod.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/policy_engine/add_lock.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/policy_engine/attach_to_policy_engine.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/policy_engine/change_counter_limits.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/policy_engine/change_counters.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/policy_engine/change_issuance_policies.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/policy_engine/change_mapping.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/policy_engine/detach_from_policy_engine.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/policy_engine/mod.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/policy_engine/remove_lock.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/cpi/policy_engine/set_counters.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/instructions/mod.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/lib.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/macros.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/state/asset_access_controller.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/state/mod.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-rbac/src/state/user_role.rs
  • rwa-rbac/rbac-utils/src/discriminators.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/error.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/events.rs
  • rwa-rbac/programs/rwa-imr/src/instructions/add_levels.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
  • b4e4053
  • 3c8c616
  • cbf7a67
  • 6778be6
  • cb2cf6c
  • 4cfcbad
  • 0fbcae3
  • bdc1436
  • fcc71cd
  • 981087e
  • e73c3cf
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

7. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

3

Informational

10

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Lack of CPI implementation for rwa-token/asset_controller/create entry pointLowSolved - 03/04/2025
Missing RBAC enforcement for some instructions of RWA programsLowSolved - 03/06/2025
Excessive authority for AccessController's admin for Securitize’s use caseLowSolved - 03/04/2025
update_fields does not enforce maximum allowed flags for UserRole permissionsInformationalSolved - 03/04/2025
RBAC Master Role Uniqueness Not EnforcedInformationalSolved - 03/12/2025
WithdrawExcessRent becomes unusable when admin is set to Pubkey::defaultInformationalSolved - 03/06/2025
Lack of checking identity_account and identity_registry for investor in some entry points of the Identity Metadata Registry programInformationalSolved - 03/06/2025
Redundant constraint on authorized_user_role.id in CreateUserRole entry pointInformationalSolved - 03/06/2025
has_any_admin_flag lacks a unit test covering all roles simultaneouslyInformationalSolved - 03/06/2025
has_medici_flag lacks unit tests for multiple scenariosInformationalSolved - 03/06/2025
Instruction discriminators are not validated for uniquenessInformationalSolved - 03/04/2025
Updates to RBAC CPI Entry Points for Compatibility with RWA Token ProgramsInformationalSolved - 03/05/2025
Unnecessary Account Growth in assignUserRole Entry PointInformationalSolved - 03/04/2025

8. Findings & Tech Details

8.1 Lack of CPI implementation for rwa-token/asset_controller/create entry point

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:L/D:N/Y:N (3.1)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.2 Missing RBAC enforcement for some instructions of RWA programs

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N (2.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.3 Excessive authority for AccessController's admin for Securitize’s use case

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:C/D:N/Y:N (2.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.4 update_fields does not enforce maximum allowed flags for UserRole permissions

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:N (1.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.5 RBAC Master Role Uniqueness Not Enforced

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:N (1.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.6 WithdrawExcessRent becomes unusable when admin is set to Pubkey::default

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:P/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:M/Y:N (0.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.7 Lack of checking identity_account and identity_registry for investor in some entry points of the Identity Metadata Registry program

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:H/AX:H/R:F/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.8 Redundant constraint on authorized_user_role.id in CreateUserRole entry point

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.9 has_any_admin_flag lacks a unit test covering all roles simultaneously

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.10 has_medici_flag lacks unit tests for multiple scenarios

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.11 Instruction discriminators are not validated for uniqueness

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.12 Updates to RBAC CPI Entry Points for Compatibility with RWA Token Programs

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.13 Unnecessary Account Growth in assignUserRole Entry Point

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Automated testing
  • 5. Risk methodology
  • 6. Scope
  • 7. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 8. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 8.1 Lack of cpi implementation for rwa-token/asset_controller/create entry point
    2. 8.2 Missing rbac enforcement for some instructions of rwa programs
    3. 8.3 Excessive authority for accesscontroller's admin for securitize’s use case
    4. 8.4 Update_fields does not enforce maximum allowed flags for userrole permissions
    5. 8.5 Rbac master role uniqueness not enforced
    6. 8.6 Withdrawexcessrent becomes unusable when admin is set to pubkey::default
    7. 8.7 Lack of checking identity_account and identity_registry for investor in some entry points of the identity metadata registry program
    8. 8.8 Redundant constraint on authorized_user_role.id in createuserrole entry point
    9. 8.9 Has_any_admin_flag lacks a unit test covering all roles simultaneously
    10. 8.10 Has_medici_flag lacks unit tests for multiple scenarios
    11. 8.11 Instruction discriminators are not validated for uniqueness
    12. 8.12 Updates to rbac cpi entry points for compatibility with rwa token programs
    13. 8.13 Unnecessary account growth in assignuserrole entry point

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