Securitize - SCA (RWA Token) Audit | Securitize

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

About this report

Assessment Type

Assurance Assessment

Date of Engagement

February 10th, 2025 - March 7th, 2025

Source Code

rwa-token

Assessed Commit ID

fb09efd

Severity Breakdown

0Risk Accepted
2Acknowledged
12Solved
14All Findings

Critical0
High0
Medium1
- 1Solved
Low0
Informational13
- 11Solved
- 2Ack.

Introduction#

Securitizeengaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their RWA Token Solana program beginning on February 10th, 2025, and ending on March 7th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the Solana Program provided in rwa-token GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

The RWA Token is a suite of programs designed to issue and manage the lifecycle of real-world asset tokens. It consists of the following programs:

Asset Controller: Manages core asset operations and enforces standardized transfer controls. It mints assets using the Token-2022 Standard (Token Extensions) with the Transfer-Hook and Permanent Delegate extensions. These features allow issuers to maintain control over tokens throughout their lifecycle, enabling actions such as freezing, seizing, and regulating transactions based on identity permissions.
Identity Registry: Provides a flexible identity issuance and tracking system to facilitate on-chain transaction permissioning. It is designed to support various regulatory frameworks by assigning identity levels to users. The issuer defines the meaning of these identity levels based on the specific requirements of their offering.
Policy Engine: Serves as an on-chain policy enforcement mechanism, ensuring transactions comply with identity-based restrictions. It validates transactions via the transfer-hook integrated into the program, enforcing regulatory and issuer-defined policies.

Assessment Summary#

Halborn was provided 18 days for the engagement and assigned two full-time security engineers to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineers are blockchain and smart contract security experts with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

Identify potential security issues within the Solana Programs.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were partially addressed by the Securitize team. The main ones are the following:

Add a verification to ensure the signer is an expected and trusted entity.
Close all related accounts when the mint is closed or preventing mint closure altogether to maintain proper tracking of associated accounts.
Add a check to ensure the authority of the revoke_token_account matches the identity owner or the wallet of the wallet identity.
Add a validation to ensure the total amount of the tracker_account for the identity_account to be closed is zero.
Ensure the delegation functionality is implemented consistently across all programs or remove it entirely if it is not needed.
Require the wallet account to be a signer in the transaction, verifying its legitimacy and ownership.
Verify that new counters have unique IDs.
Adapt counters removal to remove counters based on IDs instead of vector indices.

Test Approach and Methodology#

Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.
Mapping out possible attack vectors
Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.
Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (cargo audit).

Risk Methodology#

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

EXPLOITABILITY METRIC ( $m_e$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A)	1
Attack Origin (AO)	Specific (AO:S)	0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L)	1
	Medium (AC:M)	0.67
	High (AC:H)	0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L)	1
	Medium (AX:M)	0.67
	High (AX:H)	0.33

Exploitability

E

is calculated using the following formula:

$E = \prod m_e$

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

IMPACT METRIC ( $m_I$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)	None (C:N)	0
	Low (C:L)	0.25
	Medium (C:M)	0.5
	High (C:H)	0.75
	Critical (C:C)	1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N)	0
	Low (I:L)	0.25
	Medium (I:M)	0.5
	High (I:H)	0.75
	Critical (I:C)	1
Availability (A)	None (A:N)	0
	Low (A:L)	0.25
	Medium (A:M)	0.5
	High (A:H)	0.75
	Critical (A:C)	1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N)	0
	Low (D:L)	0.25
	Medium (D:M)	0.5
	High (D:H)	0.75
	Critical (D:C)	1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N)	0
	Low (Y:L)	0.25
	Medium (Y:M)	0.5
	High (Y:H)	0.75
	Critical (Y:C)	1

Impact

I

is calculated using the following formula:

$I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}$

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Metrics:

SEVERITY COEFFICIENT ( $C$ )	COEFFICIENT VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N)	1
	Partial (R:P)	0.5
	Full (R:F)	0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C)	1.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Unchanged (S:U)	1

Severity Coefficient

C

is obtained by the following product:

$C = rs$

The Vulnerability Severity Score

S

is obtained by:

$S = min(10, EIC * 10)$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Critical	High	Medium	Low	Informational
9 - 10	7 - 8.9	4.5 - 6.9	2 - 4.4	0 - 1.9

Scope#

(a) Repository:rwa-token

(b) Assessed Commit ID:fb09efd3757bda87fd4e69c0fa903c64138270ee

78 files

programs

74 files

asset_controller

24 files

src

22 files

instructions

16 files

account

3 files

freeze.rs

rust

mod.rs

rust

thaw.rs

rust

extensions

5 files

close_mint.rs

rust

disable_memo.rs

rust

Out-of-Scope:Third party dependencies and economic attacks.

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

Assessment Summary & Findings Overview#

#	Title	Severity	Score	Status
HAL-01	Asset Controller may be created by an unauthorized entity	Medium	6.7	Solved03/02/2025
HAL-02	Residual accounts left after mint closure	Informational	1.6	Solved03/02/2025
HAL-03	Lack of validation in token revocation can lead to data inconsistencies	Informational	1.5	Solved03/06/2025
HAL-04	Potential permanent tokens locked due to missing tracker total amount validation	Informational	1.4	Solved03/03/2025
HAL-05	Delegation implementation may lead to inconsistencies	Informational	1.3	Solved03/02/2025
HAL-06	Possibility to add counters with duplicate IDs may lead to inconsistencies	Informational	1.1	Solved03/05/2025
HAL-07	Lack of wallet validation when attaching may lead in Denial Of Service	Informational	1.1	Acknowledged03/09/2025
HAL-08	Possibility to remove incorrect counters	Informational	1.1	Solved03/05/2025
HAL-09	Lack of verification of the new delegate of the identity registry	Informational	0.7	Solved03/02/2025
HAL-10	Incorrect reallocation wastes resources and increases account rent	Informational	0.3	Solved03/02/2025
HAL-11	New lock values check missing	Informational	0.3	Acknowledged03/06/2025
HAL-12	Superfluos requested accounts	Informational	0.0	Solved03/09/2025
HAL-13	Lack of checked arithmetical operation enforcement	Informational	0.0	Solved03/06/2025
HAL-14	Program may panic due to index out of bounds	Informational	0.0	Solved03/06/2025

Remediation Comment

8. Automated Testing#

Disclaimer#

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.