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Background

// Security Assessment

10.20.2025 - 10.24.2025

V2 - CPS & Gateway

SilentSwap

Halborn logotext
← Back to Audits

V2 - CPS & Gateway - SilentSwap


Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 01/13/2026

Date of Engagement: October 20th, 2025 - October 24th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

21

Critical

2

High

0

Medium

0

Low

0

Informational

19


Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Confirmation of non-custodial architecture
  • 5. Assessment scope clarification
  • 6. Risk methodology
  • 7. Scope
  • 8. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 9. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 9.1 Reversed parameters in ecdsa signing causes total notarization failure
    2. 9.2 Inconsistent secp256k1 public key encoding breaks address derivation and permits
    3. 9.3 Unconstrained validation in verify_snip_result
    4. 9.4 Unpadded error responses create query-size side-channel
    5. 9.5 Depositproxy2 allow a forward with residual funds
    6. 9.6 Order expiration policy allows refund and claim race after payout on destination chain
    7. 9.7 Eip-712 domain incomplete missing verifyingcontract allows cross-contract replay
    8. 9.8 Notary signature format incompatible with solidity ecdsa.recover
    9. 9.9 Depositproxy2 forces “all-or-nothing” deposit (no partial amount)
    10. 9.10 Non-standard eip-191 hashing
    11. 9.11 Claim signature doesn't bind recipient
    12. 9.12 Instantiation panics when vrf randomness is unavailable
    13. 9.13 Unbounded facilitator_public_keys decoding enables dos in snip verification
    14. 9.14 Compiler version 0.8.20 has known several bugs
    15. 9.15 Direct low-level call used for eip-3009 receivewithauthorization instead of using the imported interface
    16. 9.16 Output.token is not validated in snip flow
    17. 9.17 Missing event emission on claimscap update
    18. 9.18 Unnecessary memory copy in claim() loop
    19. 9.19 Incorrect or misleading comments / docstrings
    20. 9.20 State variables that could be declared immutable in silentswapdepositor.sol
    21. 9.21 Missing unit tests for query-based flows

1. Introduction

This security assessment was commissioned by SilentSwap, a privacy-focused, non-custodial cross-chain aggregator built on the Secret Network. Conducted by Halborn’s experienced security team, the review focused on the on-chain components in the silentswap-v2-cps and silentswap-v2-gateway repositories. The assessment covered all functionalities within both CPS and Gateway contracts from October 20, 2025 to October 24, 2025. As a non-custodial protocol, SilentSwap never takes possession of user funds, users retain full control of their assets throughout every interaction. The primary objective of this engagement was to identify potential vulnerabilities, verify module reliability, and enhance the overall security posture.

2. Assessment Summary

The team at Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to verify the security of the smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.


The purpose of this assessment is to:

    • Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended

    • Identify potential security issues with the smart contract


In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks. The SilentSwap team remediated the major issues identified. The remaining informational findings have been acknowledged by the team. The main recommendations were the following:

    • Fix arguments order when invoking the sign_ecdsa_keccak_256 function.

    • Use compressed keys for all Cosmos/Secret semantics (address & Permit).

    • Implement a grace period in order to give the notary/claimer a buffer to land claims after expiry, or proof-commit mechanism to reduce operational risk of race conditions.

    • Bind the recipient and execution context in the signature.


3. Test Approach and Methodology

An unwaveringly thorough multi-phase strategy was employed for this assessment. The process comprised the following major phases:

    • Scoping and threat modeling, including architectural review to identify systemic risk areas.

    • Manual line-by-line review of the smart contract source across all identified repositories.

    • Automated tooling and static/dynamic analysis to ensure full path coverage and surfacing of subtle runtime vulnerabilities.

    • Custom on-chain test case development and execution against all critical user, protocol, and edge-case flows, mapped against real-world threat models for DeFi, cross-chain, and privacy-centric systems.

    • Continuous cross-validation of findings among specialists to eliminate blind spots and false negatives.

Manual and automated review phases were balanced for maximum coverage: static analysis flagged issues rapidly, while targeted manual work validated logic, business invariants, and protocol integrations. Major frameworks and off-the-shelf industry toolkits were leveraged, supplemented by custom tests to validate crucial behaviors under adversarial conditions.

4. Confirmation of Non-Custodial Architecture

At the request of SilentSwap, we were tasked with determining whether the platform operates as a non-custodial system. Upon completion of our review, our determination is that SilentSwap’s architecture is non-custodial.

5. Assessment Scope Clarification

The findings documented in this report for the CPS codebase are based on the source code repository provided at the time of the security assessment. Following the conclusion of the assessment, the SilentSwap team shared a new repository containing an updated version of the codebase with fixes applied to the major reported issues. The originally assessed repository is no longer in active use.

6. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

6.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_eme​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EEE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_eE=∏me​

6.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_ImI​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact III is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}I=max(mI​)+4∑mI​−max(mI​)​

6.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CCC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rrr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (sss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CCC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rsC=rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SSS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)S=min(10,EIC∗10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

7. SCOPE

REPOSITORIES
(a) Repository: silentswap-v2-cps
(b) Assessed Commit ID: aa6ef47
(c) Items in scope:
  • src/auth_msg.rs
  • src/contract.rs
  • src/eip712.rs
  • src/json.rs
  • src/snip.rs
  • src/msg.rs
  • src/aes.rs
  • src/evm.rs
  • src/secp256k1.rs
  • src/hkdf.rs
  • src/lib.rs
  • src/bin/schema.rs
  • src/key_utils.rs
  • src/sha256.rs
  • src/state.rs
  • src/auth_msg.rs
  • src/contract.rs
  • src/eip712.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
(a) Repository: silentswap-v2-gateway
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 12a0ff1
(c) Items in scope:
  • contracts/SilentSwapDepositor.sol
  • contracts/SilentSwapV2Gateway.sol
  • contracts/SilentSwapDepositor.sol
  • contracts/SilentSwapV2Gateway.sol
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
  • aa6ef47
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

8. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

2

High

0

Medium

0

Low

0

Informational

19

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Reversed parameters in ECDSA signing causes total notarization failureCriticalSolved - 10/30/2025
Inconsistent secp256k1 public key encoding breaks address derivation and PermitsCriticalSolved - 10/30/2025
Unconstrained validation in verify_snip_resultInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
Unpadded error responses create Query-Size side-channelInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
depositProxy2 allow a forward with residual fundsInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
Order Expiration Policy Allows Refund and Claim Race After Payout on Destination ChainInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
EIP-712 domain incomplete missing verifyingContract allows cross-contract replayInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
Notary signature format incompatible with Solidity ECDSA.recoverInformationalSolved - 10/30/2025
depositProxy2 forces “All-or-Nothing” Deposit (no partial amount)InformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
Non-standard EIP-191 hashingInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
Claim signature doesn't bind recipientInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
Instantiation panics when VRF randomness is unavailableInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
Unbounded facilitator_public_keys decoding enables DoS in SNIP verificationInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
Compiler version 0.8.20 has known several bugsInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
Direct low-level call used for EIP-3009 receiveWithAuthorization instead of using the imported interfaceInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
output.token is not validated in SNIP FlowInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
Missing event emission on claimsCap updateInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
Unnecessary memory copy in claim() LoopInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
Incorrect or misleading comments / docstringsInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
State variables that could be declared immutable in SilentSwapDepositor.sol InformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025
Missing unit tests for Query-Based flowsInformationalAcknowledged - 10/30/2025

9. Findings & Tech Details

9.1 Reversed parameters in ECDSA signing causes total notarization failure

//

Critical

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:C/I:N/D:N/Y:N (10.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/SilentSwapV2/silentswap-v2-cps/commit/aa6ef473b865f4d781468e08baeb76bbed306192

9.2 Inconsistent secp256k1 public key encoding breaks address derivation and Permits

//

Critical

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:C/I:N/D:N/Y:N (10.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/SilentSwapV2/silentswap-v2-cps/commit/aa6ef473b865f4d781468e08baeb76bbed306192

9.3 Unconstrained validation in verify_snip_result

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:C/D:C/Y:N (1.7)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.4 Unpadded error responses create Query-Size side-channel

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:L/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (1.7)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.5 depositProxy2 allow a forward with residual funds

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N (1.7)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.6 Order Expiration Policy Allows Refund and Claim Race After Payout on Destination Chain

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:M/Y:N (1.6)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.7 EIP-712 domain incomplete missing verifyingContract allows cross-contract replay

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:N/Y:N (1.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.8 Notary signature format incompatible with Solidity ECDSA.recover

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:H/I:N/D:N/Y:N (1.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/SilentSwapV2/silentswap-v2-cps/commit/aa6ef473b865f4d781468e08baeb76bbed306192

9.9 depositProxy2 forces “All-or-Nothing” Deposit (no partial amount)

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:P/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N (1.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.10 Non-standard EIP-191 hashing

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:P/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N (1.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.11 Claim signature doesn't bind recipient

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:F/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:C/Y:N (0.8)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.12 Instantiation panics when VRF randomness is unavailable

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:F/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.4)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.13 Unbounded facilitator_public_keys decoding enables DoS in SNIP verification

//

Informational

Description
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.14 Compiler version 0.8.20 has known several bugs

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.15 Direct low-level call used for EIP-3009 receiveWithAuthorization instead of using the imported interface

//

Informational

Description
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.16 output.token is not validated in SNIP Flow

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.17 Missing event emission on claimsCap update

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.18 Unnecessary memory copy in claim() Loop

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.19 Incorrect or misleading comments / docstrings

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.20 State variables that could be declared immutable in SilentSwapDepositor.sol

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9.21 Missing unit tests for Query-Based flows

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Confirmation of non-custodial architecture
  • 5. Assessment scope clarification
  • 6. Risk methodology
  • 7. Scope
  • 8. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 9. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 9.1 Reversed parameters in ecdsa signing causes total notarization failure
    2. 9.2 Inconsistent secp256k1 public key encoding breaks address derivation and permits
    3. 9.3 Unconstrained validation in verify_snip_result
    4. 9.4 Unpadded error responses create query-size side-channel
    5. 9.5 Depositproxy2 allow a forward with residual funds
    6. 9.6 Order expiration policy allows refund and claim race after payout on destination chain
    7. 9.7 Eip-712 domain incomplete missing verifyingcontract allows cross-contract replay
    8. 9.8 Notary signature format incompatible with solidity ecdsa.recover
    9. 9.9 Depositproxy2 forces “all-or-nothing” deposit (no partial amount)
    10. 9.10 Non-standard eip-191 hashing
    11. 9.11 Claim signature doesn't bind recipient
    12. 9.12 Instantiation panics when vrf randomness is unavailable
    13. 9.13 Unbounded facilitator_public_keys decoding enables dos in snip verification
    14. 9.14 Compiler version 0.8.20 has known several bugs
    15. 9.15 Direct low-level call used for eip-3009 receivewithauthorization instead of using the imported interface
    16. 9.16 Output.token is not validated in snip flow
    17. 9.17 Missing event emission on claimscap update
    18. 9.18 Unnecessary memory copy in claim() loop
    19. 9.19 Incorrect or misleading comments / docstrings
    20. 9.20 State variables that could be declared immutable in silentswapdepositor.sol
    21. 9.21 Missing unit tests for query-based flows

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