Join us January 23rd, 2026 in NYC for ACCESS→
← Back to Audits

Wallet + Codec - Spacemesh

Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated Unknown date

Date of Engagement: July 11th, 2024 - July 25th, 2024

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

8

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

0

Informational

8

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Spacemesh engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their wallet web application, beginning on July 11th 2024 and ending on July 25th 2024. The security assessment was scoped to the Spacemesh wallet web application.

The Spacemesh team provided the source code to Halborn in order to conduct the security assessment. Halborn's team was using different tools to scan, detect and validate possible vulnerabilities found in the wallet (statically and dynamically), reporting the findings at the end of the engagement. The client provided a source code of the wallet, which it was used during the assessment.

2. Assessment Summary

The team at Halborn was provided two weeks for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to verify the security of the Spacemesh wallet web application. The security engineer is a penetration testing expert with advanced knowledge in web, recon, discovery & infrastructure penetration testing and blockchain and smart-contracts security.

The purpose of this assessment is to:

    • Improve the security of the application by testing it both as white and black-box approaches

    • Identify potential security issues that could be affecting the web application

In summary, Halborn did not identify any critical issues but found some security risks, including four HIGH and five MEDIUM issues.

It was possible to leak the mnemonic phrase from the memory dump, as well as the users' password and private key under different scenarios. In addition, it was possible to bruteforce users passwords with the wallet information stored on disk.

Several huge amount transactions were submitted without having enough balance in the testing wallet, posing a security risk for the wallet and directly impacting on the integrity and consistency of the web application. Many other lacks of user input validation were detected as well.

Moreover, it was detected that Spacemesh wallet was using plaintext connections over HTTP. Other than that, the wallet web application was vulnerable to clickjacking attacks.

It was possible to wipe wallet data through browser "localStorage". Finally, some vulnerable dependencies were being used by the Spacemesh wallet.

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy regarding the scope of the penetration test. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process and implementation; automated testing techniques assist enhance coverage of the solution and can quickly identify flaws in it.

Several phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment, including but not limited to:

    • Mapping Application Content and Functionality

    • Private keys, mnemonic phrase, seed, and assets securely saved

    • Exposure of any critical information during user interactions with the blockchain and external libraries

    • Attacks that could impact funds, such as draining or manipulating of funds

    • Application logic flaws

    • Lack of validation on input forms and Input handling

    • Application cryptography

    • Brute force protections

    • Fuzzing

    • Test for Injection (SQL/JSON/HTML/JS/Command/Directories...)

    • Vulnerable or outdated dependencies.

    • Authentication / Authorization flaws

    • Testing for different types of sensitive information leakages: memory, clipboard, ...

    • Perform static analysis on code

    • Identify other potential vulnerabilities that may pose a risk to Spacemesh

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORIES
(a) Repository: smapp-lite
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 6b443ab
(a) Repository: sm-codec
(b) Assessed Commit ID: c774a89
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

0

Informational

8

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
PLAINTEXT SECRETS IN MEMORYInformationalSolved - 09/05/2024
INSECURE WALLET INFORMATION STORAGEInformationalSolved - 09/05/2024
BALANCE NOT CHECKED BEFORE SENDING TRANSACTION (TX)InformationalSolved - 09/17/2024
INFINITE LOOP ON Add New Network FUNCTIONALITYInformationalSolved - 09/17/2024
PLAINTEXT CONNECTIONS SUPPORTEDInformationalSolved - 07/28/2024
CLICKJACKINGInformationalSolved - 07/28/2024
VULNERABLE THIRD-PARTY DEPENDENCIESInformationalSolved - 09/23/2024
WALLET WIPE THROUGH LOCAL STORAGE OVERWRITEInformationalRisk Accepted

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 PLAINTEXT SECRETS IN MEMORY

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.2 INSECURE WALLET INFORMATION STORAGE

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.3 BALANCE NOT CHECKED BEFORE SENDING TRANSACTION (TX)

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.4 INFINITE LOOP ON Add New Network FUNCTIONALITY

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.5 PLAINTEXT CONNECTIONS SUPPORTED

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.6 CLICKJACKING

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.7 VULNERABLE THIRD-PARTY DEPENDENCIES

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.8 WALLET WIPE THROUGH LOCAL STORAGE OVERWRITE

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

// Download the full report

Wallet + Codec

* Use Google Chrome for best results

** Check "Background Graphics" in the print settings if needed