Summary
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
- 0Solved
- 7Acknowledged
- 3Risk Accepted
- 10All Findings
- Critical0
- High0
- Medium1
- 1Risk A.
- Low2
- 2Risk A.
- Informational7
- 7Ack.
Introduction#
TAEX engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on June 16th, 2025 and ending on June 17th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
The Mae Drop1 Contracts codebase in scope consists of a smart contract responsible for supporting an NFT sale through different mint phases such as a whitelist and a public phase.
Assessment Summary#
Halborn was provided 2 days for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were acknowledged by the TAEX team. The main ones were the following:
Enforce the maximum NFTs per address invariant upon moderator mints.Consider including the block chain ID in the message hash.Consider allowing users to provide a slippage upon NFT mints.
Test Approach and Methodology#
Halborn performed a manual review of the code. Manual testing is great to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation.
The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into architecture, purpose and use of the platform.
Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough to identify any logic issue.
Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions in scope that could led to arithmetic related vulnerabilities.
Risk Methodology#
4.1 EXPLOITABILITY
Attack Origin (AO):
Attack Cost (AC):
Attack Complexity (AX):
Metrics:
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) | 1 |
| Specific (AO:S) | 0.2 | |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) | 1 |
| Medium (AC:M) | 0.67 | |
| High (AC:H) | 0.33 | |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) | 1 |
| Medium (AX:M) | 0.67 | |
| High (AX:H) | 0.33 |
4.2 IMPACT
Confidentiality (C):
Integrity (I):
Availability (A):
Deposit (D):
Yield (Y):
Metrics:
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) | 0 |
| Low (C:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (C:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (C:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (C:C) | 1 | |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) | 0 |
| Low (I:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (I:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (I:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (I:C) | 1 | |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) | 0 |
| Low (A:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (A:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (A:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (A:C) | 1 | |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) | 0 |
| Low (D:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (D:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (D:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (D:C) | 1 | |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) | 0 |
| Low (Y:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (Y:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (Y:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (Y:C) | 1 |
4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT
Reversibility (R):
Scope (S):
Metrics:
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) | 1 |
| Partial (R:P) | 0.5 | |
| Full (R:F) | 0.25 | |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) | 1.25 |
| Unchanged (S:U) | 1 |
| Critical | High | Medium | Low | Informational |
| 9 - 10 | 7 - 8.9 | 4.5 - 6.9 | 2 - 4.4 | 0 - 1.9 |
Scope#
Assessment Summary & Findings Overview#
# | Title | Severity | Score | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Users are able to go over the maximum allowed mints | Medium | 5.0 | Risk Accepted06/18/2025 | |
| Users could be charged more than expected upon minting | Low | 3.4 | Risk Accepted06/18/2025 | |
| Cross-chain signature replay possible under specific conditions | Low | 2.9 | Risk Accepted06/18/2025 | |
| Unnecessary initialization of the current phase | Informational | 0.0 | Acknowledged06/18/2025 | |
| Unnecessary initialization of an NFT's metadata | Informational | 0.0 | Acknowledged06/18/2025 | |
| Unnecessary payable casts in multiple places | Informational | 0.0 | Acknowledged06/18/2025 | |
| Floating pragma | Informational | 0.0 | Acknowledged06/18/2025 | |
| Custom errors should be used | Informational | 0.0 | Acknowledged06/18/2025 | |
| Consider Using Named Mappings | Informational | 0.0 | Acknowledged06/18/2025 | |
| Functions that change state don't emit events | Informational | 0.0 | Acknowledged06/18/2025 |
Findings & Tech Details#
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Disclaimer#
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
