Solutions

Company

Resources

Blog

Contact

Login

    • Assurance

      Smart Contract Assessment

      Securing code integrity, protecting digital assets

      Blockchain Layer 1 Assessment

      Assessing protocols, securing blockchain foundations

      Code Security Audit

      Uncovering flaws, strengthening software integrity

      Web Application Penetration Testing

      Exposing weaknesses, fortifying digital defenses

      Cloud Infrastructure Penetration Testing

      Securing configurations, protecting critical environments

      Red Team Exercise

      Simulating real-world attacks, strengthening defenses

      AI Red Teaming

      Testing AI systems against real threats

      AI Security Assessment

      Securing AI models, data, and pipelines

    • Advisory

      AI Advisory

      Guiding secure, strategic AI adoption forward

      Risk Assessment

      From unknown threats to actionable insights

      Blockchain Architecture Assessment

      Optimizing architecture for tomorrow’s networks

      Compliance Readiness

      Stay ready as regulations evolve

      Custody and Key Management Assessment

      Securing the heart of digital custody

      Technical Due Diligence

      See the risks before you invest

      Technical Training

      Empower your teams to secure what matters

    • Who We Are

      The best security engineers in the world

      Careers

      Work with the elite

      Who Trusts Us

      The trusted security advisor for blockchain and financial services industries

      Brand

      Access official logos, fonts, and guidelines

      Service Commitments

      Committed to Protecting Your Data

    • Audits

      In-depth evaluations of smart contracts and blockchain infrastructures

      BVSS

      Blockchain Vulnerability Scoring System

      Disclosures

      All the latest vulnerabilities discovered by Halborn

      Case Studies

      How Halborn’s solutions have empowered clients to overcome security issues

      Reports

      Comprehensive reports and data

  • Blog

  • Contact

  • Login

THIS WEBSITE USES COOKIES

We use cookies to personalise content and ads, to provide social media features and to analyse our traffic. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners who may combine it with other information that you've provided to them or that they've collected from your use of their services. You consent to our cookies if you continue to use our website. Learn More.

STAY CURRENT WITH HALBORN

Subscribe to the monthly Halborn Digest for our top blogs and videos, major company announcements, new whitepapers, webinar and event invites, and one exclusive interview.

ADVISORY SERVICES

AI AdvisoryRisk AssessmentBlockchain Architecture AssessmentCompliance ReadinessCustody and Key Management AssessmentTechnical Due DiligenceTechnical Training

ASSURANCE SERVICES

AI Security AssessmentAI Red TeamingSmart Contract AssessmentBlockchain Layer 1 AssessmentCode Security AuditWeb Application Penetration TestingCloud Infrastructure Penetration TestingRed Team Exercise

COMPANY

Who We AreWho Trusts UsService CommitmentsCareersBrandBlogContact

RESOURCES

AuditsDisclosuresReportsBVSSCase Studies
Halborn Logo
Privacy PolicyTerms of UseVulnerability Disclosure Policy

© Halborn 2025. All rights reserved.

Background

// Security Assessment

07.01.2025 - 07.09.2025

CMTAT

Taurus

Halborn logotext
← Back to Audits

CMTAT - Taurus


Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 09/04/2025

Date of Engagement: July 1st, 2025 - July 9th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

11

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

2

Informational

9


Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Caveats
  • 5. Risk methodology
  • 6. Scope
  • 7. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 8. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 8.1 Minting and burning operations bypass the pause mechanism
    2. 8.2 Insufficient allowance validation during forced transfers
    3. 8.3 Floating pragma
    4. 8.4 Misleading restriction code returned for deactivated contract
    5. 8.5 Commented functionality
    6. 8.6 Typos
    7. 8.7 Public functions not called within contracts
    8. 8.8 Misleading comment regarding frozen balance calculation
    9. 8.9 Inconsistent method of calling inherited functions
    10. 8.10 Lack of named mappings
    11. 8.11 Unused file
  • 9. Automated Testing

1. Introduction

Taurus engaged Halborn to perform a security assessment of their smart contracts from July 1st, 2025, to July 9th, 2025. The assessment scope was limited to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and additional details are available in the Scope section of this report.


The Taurus codebase in scope consists of a Solidity implementation of the CMTAT security token framework, featuring modular compliance and technical capabilities for regulated financial assets on EVM-compatible blockchains, featuring compliance controls and upgradeability.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was allocated 7 days for this engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to conduct a comprehensive review of the smart contracts within scope. The engineer is an expert in blockchain and smart contract security, with advanced skills in penetration testing and smart contract exploitation, as well as extensive knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.


The objectives of this assessment were to:

    • Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.

    • Verify that the smart contract functionality operates as intended.


In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of potential risks, which were partially addressed by the Taurus team. The primary recommendations were as follows:

    • Modify the _canMintBurnByModule() function to respect the paused state.

    • Modify the _forcedTransfer() function to handle allowances in a safe and predictable manner.

    • Lock the pragma version to the same version used during development and testing.


3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn conducted a combination of manual code review and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy within the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is crucial for identifying flaws in logic, processes, and implementation, automated testing enhances coverage of smart contracts and quickly detects deviations from established security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were employed throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the platform's architecture, purpose and use.

    • Manual code review and walkthrough of smart contracts to identify any logical issues.

    • Comprehensive assessment of the safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions within scope that could lead to arithmetic-related vulnerabilities.

    • Local testing using custom scripts (Foundry).

    • Fork testing against main networks (Foundry).

    • Static security analysis of scoped contracts, and imported functions (Slither).


4. Caveats

After the initial assessment, Taurus reported an additional compliance issue affecting batch operations. Halborn performed a post-assessment review at commit 198d019 to verify the fixes, and confirmed that the issue has been addressed at that commit.

5. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

5.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_eme​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EEE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_eE=∏me​

5.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_ImI​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact III is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}I=max(mI​)+4∑mI​−max(mI​)​

5.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CCC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rrr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (sss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CCC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rsC=rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SSS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)S=min(10,EIC∗10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

6. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: CMTAT
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 04dad82
(c) Items in scope:
  • contracts/deployment/CMTATStandalone.sol
  • contracts/deployment/CMTATUpgradeable.sol
  • contracts/deployment/CMTATUpgradeableUUPS.sol
  • contracts/deployment/ERC1363/CMTATStandaloneERC1363.sol
  • contracts/deployment/ERC1363/CMTATUpgradeableERC1363.sol
  • contracts/deployment/ERC7551/CMTATStandaloneERC7551.sol
  • contracts/deployment/ERC7551/CMTATUpgradeableERC7551.sol
  • contracts/deployment/allowlist/CMTATStandaloneAllowlist.sol
  • contracts/deployment/allowlist/CMTATUpgradeableAllowlist.sol
  • contracts/deployment/debt/CMTATStandaloneDebt.sol
  • contracts/deployment/debt/CMTATUpgradeableDebt.sol
  • contracts/deployment/light/CMTATStandaloneLight.sol
  • contracts/deployment/light/CMTATUpgradeableLight.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/engine/IDebtEngine.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/engine/IDocumentEngine.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/engine/IRuleEngine.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/engine/ISnapshotEngine.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/modules/IAllowlistModule.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/modules/IDebtModule.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/modules/IDocumentEngineModule.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/modules/ISnapshotEngineModule.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/technical/ICMTATConstructor.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/technical/IERC20Allowance.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/technical/IERC7802.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/technical/IMintBurnToken.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/tokenization/ICMTAT.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/tokenization/IERC3643Partial.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/tokenization/draft-IERC1404.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/tokenization/draft-IERC1643.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/tokenization/draft-IERC1643CMTAT.sol
  • contracts/interfaces/tokenization/draft-IERC7551.sol
  • contracts/libraries/Errors.sol
  • contracts/modules/0_CMTATBaseCommon.sol
  • contracts/modules/0_CMTATBaseCore.sol
  • contracts/modules/0_CMTATBaseGeneric.sol
  • contracts/modules/1_CMTATBaseAllowlist.sol
  • contracts/modules/1_CMTATBaseRuleEngine.sol
  • contracts/modules/2_CMTATBaseDebt.sol
  • contracts/modules/2_CMTATBaseERC1404.sol
  • contracts/modules/3_CMTATBaseERC20CrossChain.sol
  • contracts/modules/4_CMTATBaseERC2771.sol
  • contracts/modules/5_CMTATBaseERC1363.sol
  • contracts/modules/5_CMTATBaseERC7551.sol
  • contracts/modules/internal/AllowlistModuleInternal.sol
  • contracts/modules/internal/ERC20BurnModuleInternal.sol
  • contracts/modules/internal/ERC20EnforcementModuleInternal.sol
  • contracts/modules/internal/ERC20MintModuleInternal.sol
  • contracts/modules/internal/EnforcementModuleInternal.sol
  • contracts/modules/internal/ValidationModuleRuleEngineInternal.sol
  • contracts/modules/internal/common/EnforcementModuleLibrary.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/controllers/ValidationModule.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/controllers/ValidationModuleAllowlist.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/core/BaseModule.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/core/ERC20BaseModule.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/core/ERC20BurnModule.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/core/ERC20MintModule.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/core/EnforcementModule.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/core/PauseModule.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/core/ValidationModuleCore.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/extensions/DocumentEngineModule.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/extensions/ERC20EnforcementModule.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/extensions/ExtraInformationModule.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/extensions/SnapshotEngineModule.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/extensions/ValidationModule/ValidationModuleERC1404.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/extensions/ValidationModule/ValidationModuleRuleEngine.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/options/AllowlistModule.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/options/DebtEngineModule.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/options/DebtModule.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/options/ERC2771Module.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/options/ERC7551Module.sol
  • contracts/modules/wrapper/security/AccessControlModule.sol
  • contracts/deployment/CMTATStandalone.sol
  • contracts/deployment/CMTATUpgradeable.sol
  • contracts/deployment/CMTATUpgradeableUUPS.sol
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
  • 067244a
  • 86dbd2d
  • 4d0a72f
  • 6b1c32e
  • 52e1106
  • f6021de
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

7. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

2

Informational

9

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Minting and burning operations bypass the pause mechanismLowFuture Release - 07/16/2025
Insufficient allowance validation during forced transfersLowRisk Accepted - 07/16/2025
Floating pragmaInformationalAcknowledged - 07/16/2025
Misleading restriction code returned for deactivated contractInformationalSolved - 07/16/2025
Commented functionalityInformationalSolved - 07/16/2025
TyposInformationalSolved - 07/16/2025
Public functions not called within contractsInformationalAcknowledged - 07/16/2025
Misleading comment regarding frozen balance calculationInformationalSolved - 07/16/2025
Inconsistent method of calling inherited functionsInformationalSolved - 07/16/2025
Lack of named mappingsInformationalSolved - 07/16/2025
Unused fileInformationalAcknowledged - 07/16/2025

8. Findings & Tech Details

8.1 Minting and burning operations bypass the pause mechanism

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:C/D:C/Y:N (2.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.2 Insufficient allowance validation during forced transfers

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:C/Y:N (2.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.3 Floating pragma

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N (0.8)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.4 Misleading restriction code returned for deactivated contract

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:H/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N (0.6)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/CMTA/CMTAT/commit/067244a0801554e2c2a7512573d005e450ffa765

8.5 Commented functionality

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/CMTA/CMTAT/commit/86dbd2d0151cfd9825f477bbcbc9848fd69c24c1

8.6 Typos

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/CMTA/CMTAT/commit/4d0a72f4646a10293cc11f2f1dbc666798acc054

8.7 Public functions not called within contracts

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.8 Misleading comment regarding frozen balance calculation

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/CMTA/CMTAT/commit/6b1c32e7dd1b7435ea7b829d1a684f22b80ad113

8.9 Inconsistent method of calling inherited functions

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/CMTA/CMTAT/commit/52e1106bc807057b5b367476661c8090e2b0aae2

8.10 Lack of named mappings

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/CMTA/CMTAT/commit/f6021de5102172584816d8015e9d4c32f3e4ef68

8.11 Unused file

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

9. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Caveats
  • 5. Risk methodology
  • 6. Scope
  • 7. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 8. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 8.1 Minting and burning operations bypass the pause mechanism
    2. 8.2 Insufficient allowance validation during forced transfers
    3. 8.3 Floating pragma
    4. 8.4 Misleading restriction code returned for deactivated contract
    5. 8.5 Commented functionality
    6. 8.6 Typos
    7. 8.7 Public functions not called within contracts
    8. 8.8 Misleading comment regarding frozen balance calculation
    9. 8.9 Inconsistent method of calling inherited functions
    10. 8.10 Lack of named mappings
    11. 8.11 Unused file
  • 9. Automated Testing

// Download the full report

CMTAT

* Use Google Chrome for best results

** Check "Background Graphics" in the print settings if needed