Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 10/07/2025
Date of Engagement: September 25th, 2025 - September 30th, 2025
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
3
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
1
Low
0
Informational
2
Tea-Fi engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on September 25th, 2025 and ending on September 30th, 2025. The scope of this assessment was limited to the smart contracts provided to the Halborn team. Commit hashes and additional details are documented in the Scope section of this report.
The contracts in scope are:
A modification of Aave v3's PoolAdressesProvider to include an access control on a liquidator proxy address.
A liquidator proxy, whitelist of operators allowed to liquidate aave positions through that proxy.
An ERC20 token with access control given to exclusive operators.
Halborn was provided 3 days for the engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce both the likelihood and impact of potential risks, which were mostly addressed by the Tea-Fi team. The primary suggestions included:
Allow same asset liquidation.
Add domain separator in merkle hashes.
Reset allowances after transfers.
Halborn performed a combination of manual code review and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is essential to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation, automated testing techniques enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify issues that do not follow security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the assessment:
Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
Manual code review and walkthrough of the smart contracts to identify potential logic issues.
Manual testing of all core functions, including createCampaign, claim to validate expected behavior and identify edge-case vulnerabilities.
Local testing to simulate contract interactions and validate functional and security assumptions.
Local deployment and testing with Foundry.
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
1
Low
0
Informational
2
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Liquidator proxy does not support same asset liquidations | Medium | Solved - 10/01/2025 |
| Merkle tree does not use domain separator | Informational | Solved - 10/01/2025 |
| Allowance not reset after external transfer from call | Informational | Acknowledged - 10/01/2025 |
//Medium
//Informational
//Informational
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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