AAVE V3 Origin - Tea-Fi

Prepared by:

HALBORN

Last Updated 10/07/2025

Date of Engagement: September 25th, 2025 - September 30th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Informational

1. Introduction
2. Assessment summary
3. Test approach and methodology
4. Risk methodology
5. Scope
6. Assessment summary & findings overview
7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Liquidator proxy does not support same asset liquidations
7.2 Merkle tree does not use domain separator
7.3 Allowance not reset after external transfer from call

1. Introduction

Tea-Fi engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on September 25th, 2025 and ending on September 30th, 2025. The scope of this assessment was limited to the smart contracts provided to the Halborn team. Commit hashes and additional details are documented in the Scope section of this report.

The contracts in scope are:

A modification of Aave v3's PoolAdressesProvider to include an access control on a liquidator proxy address.
A liquidator proxy, whitelist of operators allowed to liquidate aave positions through that proxy.
An ERC20 token with access control given to exclusive operators.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided 3 days for the engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.

In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce both the likelihood and impact of potential risks, which were mostly addressed by the Tea-Fi team. The primary suggestions included:

Allow same asset liquidation.
Add domain separator in merkle hashes.
Reset allowances after transfers.

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual code review and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is essential to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation, automated testing techniques enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify issues that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the assessment:

Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
Manual code review and walkthrough of the smart contracts to identify potential logic issues.
Manual testing of all core functions, including createCampaign, claim to validate expected behavior and identify edge-case vulnerabilities.
Local testing to simulate contract interactions and validate functional and security assumptions.
Local deployment and testing with Foundry.

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

EXPLOITABILITY METRIC ( $m_e$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S)	1 0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H)	1 0.67 0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H)	1 0.67 0.33

Exploitability

E

is calculated using the following formula:

$E = \prod m_e$

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

IMPACT METRIC ( $m_I$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)	None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Availability (A)	None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1

Impact

I

is calculated using the following formula:

$I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}$

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Metrics:

SEVERITY COEFFICIENT ( $C$ )	COEFFICIENT VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F)	1 0.5 0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U)	1.25 1

Severity Coefficient

C

is obtained by the following product:

$C = rs$

The Vulnerability Severity Score

S

is obtained by:

$S = min(10, EIC * 10)$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Severity	Score Value Range
Critical	9 - 10
High	7 - 8.9
Medium	4.5 - 6.9
Low	2 - 4.4
Informational	0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORIES

(a) Repository: aave-v3-origin

(b) Assessed Commit ID: b99a898

aave-v3-origin/src/contracts/protocol/pool/Pool.sol
aave-v3-origin/src/contracts/interfaces/IPool.sol
aave-v3-origin/src/contracts/protocol/configuration/PoolAddressesProvider.sol

↓ Expand ↓

Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.

(a) Repository: contracts

(b) Assessed Commit ID: 59c4591

contracts/contracts/liquidator-proxy/LiquidatorProxy.sol
contracts/contracts/liquidator-proxy/interfaces/ILiquidatorProxy.sol
contracts/contracts/interfaces/IAavePoolV3.sol

↓ Expand ↓

Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.

Remediation Commit ID:

5d83f38
63d6715

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Informational

Security analysis	Risk level	Remediation Date
Liquidator proxy does not support same asset liquidations	Medium	Solved - 10/01/2025
Merkle tree does not use domain separator	Informational	Solved - 10/01/2025
Allowance not reset after external transfer from call	Informational	Acknowledged - 10/01/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Liquidator proxy does not support same asset liquidations

Medium

Description

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:H/I:N/D:N/Y:N (5.0)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.2 Merkle tree does not use domain separator

Informational

Description

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:N (1.6)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.3 Allowance not reset after external transfer from call

Informational

Description

BVSS

AO:S/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:C/Y:N (0.7)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

1. Introduction
2. Assessment summary
3. Test approach and methodology
4. Risk methodology
5. Scope
6. Assessment summary & findings overview
7. Findings & Tech Details

AAVE V3 Origin

Tea-Fi

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. Assessment Summary

3. Test Approach and Methodology

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Attack Cost (AC):

Attack Complexity (AX):

Metrics:

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Integrity (I):

Availability (A):

Deposit (D):

Yield (Y):

Metrics:

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Scope (S):

Metrics:

5. SCOPE

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Liquidator proxy does not support same asset liquidations

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.2 Merkle tree does not use domain separator

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.3 Allowance not reset after external transfer from call

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Table of Contents