Bridge Contracts - Tea-Fi


Prepared by:

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HALBORN

Last Updated 10/29/2025

Date of Engagement: October 1st, 2025 - October 9th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

11

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

1

Low

4

Informational

6


1. INTRODUCTION

Tea-Fi engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of their smart contracts between October 1, 2025 and October 11, 2025. The engagement focused on the protocol’s core components responsible for custody (Vault), cross‑chain transfers (Bridge Adapter), and yield generation (Aave Strategy), with an emphasis on correctness, robustness to edge cases, and protection of user and treasury value.


The review was performed against the codebase provided by Tea-Fi (see Engagement Details and Scope) and included a comprehensive, self‑contained Foundry test suite authored during the assessment. The suite combines unit tests, property/invariant tests, and fuzzing to validate expected behavior and adversarial scenarios locally (no external networks required).

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

A full‑time Halborn security engineer with deep smart‑contract security expertise performed the assessment, combining manual code review with automated testing to maximize coverage and realism.


Objectives:

    • Verify contract behavior and state transitions match intention under normal and adverse conditions.

    • Identify vulnerabilities, economic inconsistencies, and unsafe assumptions.

    • Validate access control, accounting (1:1 shares, principal vs. yield), and cross‑component interactions (bridge fees, strategy divest/harvest semantics).


Highlights and recommendations:

    • Bridge Adapter: Add a caller‑provided maxFee and select native fees by token type (not array index). Sanitize empty/misaligned quotes; emit messageId events for observability.

    • Aave Strategy: Clamp divest requests to booked principal to prevent yield leakage; consider allowance hygiene (exact approvals or emergency revoke).

    • Vault (ERC‑4626, 1:1): Enforce runtime balance‑delta checks to reject fee‑on‑transfer tokens; forbid rebasing assets; consider an emergency withdrawal mode (on‑hand only) if the strategy misbehaves.


Overall, the codebase demonstrates clear security intent. The recommendations above reduce both likelihood and blast radius of operational risks while strengthening user and treasury safety.

3. CAVEATS

    • Scope limits: Only the contracts and files listed in Scope were reviewed. External systems (e.g., Hyperlane router internals, Aave protocol), off‑chain infrastructure, and out‑of‑scope directories were treated as black boxes.

    • Assumptions: Standard token behavior is assumed unless explicitly tested (e.g., fee‑on‑transfer and rebasing tokens were explored via mocks). Economic conditions beyond contract‑level invariants (market liquidity, MEV dynamics) were out of scope.

    • Differential context: Findings are referenced against the scoped commit; external changes not visible in scope are excluded.


A full end‑to‑end assessment—covering off‑chain services, cross‑chain ops, and production deployment posture—is recommended for a complete security picture.

4. TEST APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Halborn employed a blended approach:

    • Architecture and design review

    • Mapped trust boundaries (Vault <> Strategy <> Adapter) and critical invariants (1:1 shares, principal vs. yield).

    • Traced cross‑chain fee/payment flows and message handling assumptions.

    • Manual code review

    • Access control (roles/ownership), edge‑case guards (zero values/addresses), error handling.

    • Failure‑path analysis (divest shortfalls, harvest misclassification, migration under‑reporting).

    • Automated security testing (Foundry)

    • Unit tests: Validate happy paths and failure modes across Vault, Adapter, and Strategy.

    • Property/invariant tests: Enforce invariants like totalPrincipal = min(aToken, booked); totalAssets composition; strict 1:1 conversions.

    • Fuzz tests: Randomized sequences to uncover emergent bugs (e.g., yield leakage on divest > principal; adapter fee selection quirks).

    • Self‑contained mocks: Hyperlane Router, WETH, Aave Pool (including shortfalls, reverts, and reentrancy attempts).

    • Reproducible evidence

    • All tests run locally with forge test --match-path "test/security/*.t.sol" -vv.

    • Nexus‑formatted test cases prepared for all confirmed findings to streamline client tracking.


This methodology balances depth (manual reasoning) with breadth (automated coverage), producing precise, reproducible evidence for every finding and recommendation.

5. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

5.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=meE = \prod m_e

5.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+mImax(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

5.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

6. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: contracts
(b) Assessed Commit ID: f1b5aab
(c) Items in scope:
  • contracts/bridge/SteamFiBridgeVault.sol
  • contracts/bridge/SteamFiBridgeAdapter.sol
  • contracts/bridge/strategies/AaveYieldStrategy.sol
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: contracts/pre-vaults/*, contracts/synths/*, contracts/liquidator-proxy/*, contracts/test/*, ignition/modules/*, scripts/*, third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
  • 65ba721
  • 4cf79b1
  • f07fce6
  • 2cfd788
  • 9327392
  • d1e42c6
  • 9211c8a
  • be77967
  • 2c6bc82
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

7. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

1

Low

4

Informational

6

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Possible Yield Leakage When Requested Amount Exceeds Booked PrincipalMediumSolved - 10/14/2025
Unlimited Allowance to Aave PoolLowSolved - 10/14/2025
No Emergency Exit From StrategyLowSolved - 10/14/2025
No Validation of Divested Amounts in withdraw() / redeem()LowSolved - 10/15/2025
No maxFee Bound Allows Fee SpikesLowSolved - 10/15/2025
Fee Token Mis-Selection Leads to Wrong ETH Fee PaymentInformationalSolved - 10/15/2025
Lenient Strategy Validation Can Allow MisconfigurationInformationalSolved - 10/15/2025
RotalAssets Excludes Unharvested YieldInformationalAcknowledged - 10/15/2025
Fee-on-Transfer Tokens Cause Under-CollateralizationInformationalSolved - 10/15/2025
Rebasing Tokens Break Withdrawals (1:1 Model)InformationalAcknowledged - 10/15/2025
Strategy Migration Can Strand Funds When totalPrincipal Under ReportsInformationalSolved - 10/15/2025

8. Findings & Tech Details

8.1 Possible Yield Leakage When Requested Amount Exceeds Booked Principal

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.2 Unlimited Allowance to Aave Pool

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.3 No Emergency Exit From Strategy

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.4 No Validation of Divested Amounts in withdraw() / redeem()

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.5 No maxFee Bound Allows Fee Spikes

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.6 Fee Token Mis-Selection Leads to Wrong ETH Fee Payment

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.7 Lenient Strategy Validation Can Allow Misconfiguration

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.8 RotalAssets Excludes Unharvested Yield

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.9 Fee-on-Transfer Tokens Cause Under-Collateralization

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.10 Rebasing Tokens Break Withdrawals (1:1 Model)

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.11 Strategy Migration Can Strand Funds When totalPrincipal Under Reports

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.