Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 05/02/2025
Date of Engagement: February 3rd, 2025 - February 5th, 2025
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
3
Critical
0
High
3
Medium
0
Low
0
Informational
0
THORChain engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of the Rujira Pools (BOW) contracts, beginning on February 3rd, 2025 and ending on February 5th, 2025. This security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts in the Rujira GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
Rujira Trade (FIN) is a fully on-chain, decentralized orderbook DEX that combines an O(1) matching algorithm with liquidity from multiple sources, including Rujira's AMM pools (BOW) and THORChain’s Base Layer liquidity.
The team at Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to verify the security of the smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of this assessment is to:
Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were successfully addressed by the Rujira team. The main ones were the following:
Calculate the price using the total pool values to prevent precision loss and underflow errors.
Ensure consistent rounding behavior in both MM and XYK swaps.
Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:
Research into architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
Manual code read and walk through.
Manual Assessment of use and safety for the critical Rust variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.
Architecture related logical controls.
Cross contract call controls.
Scanning of Rust files for vulnerabilities(cargo audit)
Review and improvement of integration tests.
Verification of integration tests and implementation of new ones.
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
3
Medium
0
Low
0
Informational
0
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Precision Loss in Price Calculation Leading to Underflow Error | High | Solved - 04/08/2025 |
| Rounding Errors in Market Maker and XYK Swap Causing Insufficient Return Error | High | Solved - 04/08/2025 |
| RUJIRA - Liquidity Overwritten on Deposit | High | Solved - 04/29/2025 |
//High
//High
//High
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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