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Background

// Security Assessment

08.11.2025 - 08.20.2025

CALC - Manager/Scheduler/Strategy

THORChain

Halborn logotext
← Back to Audits

CALC - Manager/Scheduler/Strategy - THORChain


Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 08/27/2025

Date of Engagement: August 11th, 2025 - August 20th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

10

Critical

1

High

0

Medium

1

Low

4

Informational

4


Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Risk methodology
  • 5. Scope
  • 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 7. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 7.1 Public trigger enumeration enables rebate theft via overwrite
    2. 7.2 Duplicate denoms are double-counted leading to over-allocation
    3. 7.3 Rune incorrectly treated as non-secured in distribution deposits
    4. 7.4 Linearscalar compares inverse price metrics
    5. 7.5 Linearscalar ignores available balance (thor)
    6. 7.6 Top-of-book reliance enables cheap price spoofing to influence strategy decisions
    7. 7.7 Missing guards in fin pricing paths
    8. 7.8 Withdraw policy on partial fills may cause unnecessary churn or exposure gaps
    9. 7.9 Over-fetching fin book levels (limit=10) while using only top-of-book
    10. 7.10 Strategy balances query reports only limit-order positions, omitting other contract funds

1. Introduction

This report was commissioned by THORChain, a leading decentralized liquidity network, to assess the security and robustness of the CALC Manager, Scheduler, and Strategy smart contracts. The assessment was performed by Halborn’s experienced security team, focusing on the code released at commit 632c63b. The review covered all functionality in manager.wasm, scheduler.wasm, and strategy.wasm between the 11th August 11, 2025, and 20th August 20, 2025. The primary objective of this engagement’s core purpose was to identify vulnerabilities, ensure protocol reliabilityand strengthen overall security.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn’s team of seasoned specialists performed a comprehensive security assessment over a 8-day period. The key goals included discovering critical vulnerabilities, evaluating strategic robustness, and improving protocol defenses.


The overall security posture showed ambitious protocols with substantial complexity; several impactful issues were identified. Noteworthy fixes include resolution of a severe rebate-stealing vulnerability in the Scheduler contract, along with remediation of other high- and medium-priority issues—such as input validation weaknesses, logic errors in price comparison, and insufficient robustness against market manipulation. Operational and configurability enhancements were also successfully implemented.


All findings have been addressed and remediated by the Calc team.

3. Test Approach and Methodology

A hybrid methodology was used, balancing deep manual review with targeted automated analysis. The work began with codebase familiarization, design verification, and threat modeling. Manual inspection dissected business logic, access control, storage management, and validator relationships. Automated static analysis scanned for low-level errors and overlooked vulnerabilities. Simulated execution and scenario testing further stressed edge cases and protocol invariants. The rigorous sequencing of methods ensures that coverage was exhaustive, with no reliance on checklist-based auditing. Continuous collaboration with the development team enabled rapid triage and remediation of critical findings.

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_eme​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EEE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_eE=∏me​

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_ImI​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact III is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}I=max(mI​)+4∑mI​−max(mI​)​

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CCC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rrr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (sss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CCC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rsC=rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SSS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)S=min(10,EIC∗10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORIES
(a) Repository: calc-rs
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 939d055
(a) Repository: calc-rs
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 632c63b
(c) Items in scope:
  • contracts/scheduler/src/lib.rs
  • contracts/scheduler/src/state.rs
  • contracts/scheduler/src/contract.rs
  • contracts/manager/src/lib.rs
  • contracts/manager/src/state.rs
  • contracts/manager/src/contract.rs
  • contracts/strategy/src/lib.rs
  • contracts/strategy/src/state.rs
  • contracts/strategy/src/contract.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/core.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/strategy.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/operation.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/constants.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/lib.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/manager.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/scheduler.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/conditions/mod.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/conditions/schedule.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/conditions/condition.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/actions/distribution.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/actions/limit_orders/fin_limit_order.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/actions/limit_orders/mod.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/actions/action.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/actions/swaps/thor.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/actions/swaps/swap.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/actions/swaps/mod.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/actions/swaps/fin.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/actions/mod.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/thorchain.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/cadence.rs
  • contracts/scheduler/src/lib.rs
  • contracts/scheduler/src/state.rs
  • contracts/scheduler/src/contract.rs
↓ Expand ↓
(a) Repository: calc-rs
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 39df0d2
(c) Items in scope:
  • packages/calc-rs/src/conditions/asset_value_ratio.rs
  • packages/calc-rs/src/conditions/asset_value_ratio.rs
Remediation Commit ID:
  • e2d69c6
  • 4f67728
  • e97cbec
  • https://github.com/calculated-finance/calc-rs/pull/15
  • 33125ec
  • 65d19c0
  • 6370032
  • e408660
  • 3e3519d
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

1

High

0

Medium

1

Low

4

Informational

4

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Public trigger enumeration enables rebate theft via overwriteCriticalSolved - 08/13/2025
Duplicate denoms are double-counted leading to over-allocationMediumSolved - 08/18/2025
RUNE incorrectly treated as non-secured in Distribution depositsLowSolved - 08/18/2025
LinearScalar compares inverse price metricsLowSolved - 08/18/2025
LinearScalar ignores available balance (Thor)LowSolved - 08/18/2025
Top-of-book reliance enables cheap price spoofing to influence strategy decisionsLowSolved - 08/21/2025
Missing guards in FIN pricing pathsInformationalSolved - 08/20/2025
Withdraw policy on partial fills may cause unnecessary churn or exposure gapsInformationalSolved - 08/20/2025
Over-fetching FIN Book levels (limit=10) while using only top-of-bookInformationalSolved - 08/21/2025
Strategy Balances query reports only limit-order positions, omitting other contract fundsInformationalSolved - 08/23/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Public trigger enumeration enables rebate theft via overwrite

//

Critical

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:C/Y:N (10.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/calculated-finance/calc-rs/commit/e2d69c6e4f007a3189b4f97be9e1103d961ccceb

7.2 Duplicate denoms are double-counted leading to over-allocation

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:M/I:N/D:N/Y:N (5.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/calculated-finance/calc-rs/commit/4f67728fc4146c6f4e4b50c394379d6c373519ff

7.3 RUNE incorrectly treated as non-secured in Distribution deposits

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N (2.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/calculated-finance/calc-rs/commit/e97cbeced9c06057f1d9de64e7a6315bd9a007bf

7.4 LinearScalar compares inverse price metrics

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N (2.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/calculated-finance/calc-rs/pull/15

7.5 LinearScalar ignores available balance (Thor)

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N (2.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/calculated-finance/calc-rs/pull/15

7.6 Top-of-book reliance enables cheap price spoofing to influence strategy decisions

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:L/D:N/Y:N (2.1)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/calculated-finance/calc-rs/commit/33125ecbc99503ca4650478fd921b15d755ff5fa

7.7 Missing guards in FIN pricing paths

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N (1.7)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/calculated-finance/calc-rs/commit/65d19c099bc21b7a4c258482aeaa96605143c39d

7.8 Withdraw policy on partial fills may cause unnecessary churn or exposure gaps

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/calculated-finance/calc-rs/commit/637003258adbd27b3d6bf1efbe7b6565a9e0dcfc

7.9 Over-fetching FIN Book levels (limit=10) while using only top-of-book

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/calculated-finance/calc-rs/commit/e408660c76dddaabf83960b4e29539834e28983a

7.10 Strategy Balances query reports only limit-order positions, omitting other contract funds

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/calculated-finance/calc-rs/commit/3e3519d52f6fce68ef09e1ad56187cb1891f364f

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Risk methodology
  • 5. Scope
  • 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 7. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 7.1 Public trigger enumeration enables rebate theft via overwrite
    2. 7.2 Duplicate denoms are double-counted leading to over-allocation
    3. 7.3 Rune incorrectly treated as non-secured in distribution deposits
    4. 7.4 Linearscalar compares inverse price metrics
    5. 7.5 Linearscalar ignores available balance (thor)
    6. 7.6 Top-of-book reliance enables cheap price spoofing to influence strategy decisions
    7. 7.7 Missing guards in fin pricing paths
    8. 7.8 Withdraw policy on partial fills may cause unnecessary churn or exposure gaps
    9. 7.9 Over-fetching fin book levels (limit=10) while using only top-of-book
    10. 7.10 Strategy balances query reports only limit-order positions, omitting other contract funds

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