RUJI Lending - THORChain


Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 12/08/2025

Date of Engagement: October 20th, 2025 - October 24th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

8

Critical

0

High

1

Medium

1

Low

1

Informational

5


1. Introduction

THORChain engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of the Ghost Vault smart contract, beginning on October 19th, 2025 and ending on October 23th, 2025. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Sources section of this report.


Ghost Vault is a CosmWasm-based lending and borrowing protocol designed to operate on top of the Rujira ecosystem. It enables users to deposit native assets into a vault and earn interest, while allowing borrowers to draw liquidity against those deposits. The protocol maintains two internal accounting pools (a deposit pool and a debt pool) and determines interest rates dynamically based on real-time utilization ratios. Interest accrual is applied linearly over time, and all interactions (deposits, borrows, repayments, withdrawals) trigger synchronization of the accumulated interest between pools.


2. Assessment Summary

The team at Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to evaluate the security of the smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract auditing, and deep knowledge of CosmWasm and other Web3 ecosystems.


The purpose of this assessment is to:

    • Ensure that core vault functions operate as intended and maintain consistent accounting between depositors and borrowers.

    • Identify potential vulnerabilities or logic flaws in the interest calculation, liquidity management, and share issuance mechanisms.


In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were mostly addressed by the Rujira team. The primary recommendations were the following:

    • Convert overpayment shares back to base tokens before refunding to ensure accurate user reimbursements.

    • Enforce borrower limits in base tokens instead of shares to prevent exceeding the real debt cap.

    • Apply interest in chunks and update last_updated incrementally to avoid persistent DoS after long idle periods.

    • Reject or accumulate tiny deposits that would mint zero shares to prevent silent value donation.

    • Add a hard APR cap to prevent extreme rates or unsafe configurations.

    • Validate all new interest parameters on sudo SetInterest to reject invalid or unsafe curves.

    • Add a guard in repay for an empty debt pool to prevent division-by-zero reverts.

    • Introduce a sudo-controlled pause mechanism to allow emergency stopping of critical operations during incidents.


3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:

    • Research into architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.

    • Manual code read and walk through.

    • Manual Assessment of use and safety for the critical Rust variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.

    • Architecture related logical controls.

    • Cross contract call controls.

    • Scanning of Rust files for vulnerabilities (cargo audit)

    • Review and verification of integration tests.


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+mImax(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: rujira
(b) Assessed Commit ID: fbf80aa
(c) Items in scope:
  • contracts/rujira-ghost-vault/src/events.rs
  • contracts/rujira-ghost-vault/src/error.rs
  • contracts/rujira-ghost-vault/src/config.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

1

Medium

1

Low

1

Informational

5

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Overpayment refunded in shares instead of base tokensHighSolved - 10/28/2025
Borrow limit checked in share units allows exceeding base-token capMediumSolved - 11/06/2025
Silent zero-share issuance from small depositsLowSolved - 10/08/2025
Persistent DoS due to large idle-time interest accrual InformationalSolved - 11/24/2025
Lack of hard cap and unsafe default Interest parametersInformationalAcknowledged - 11/28/2025
Missing validation on sudo SetInterest allows invalid interest curvesInformationalSolved - 11/24/2025
Division-by-zero on repay when the debt pool is emptyInformationalSolved - 11/25/2025
No sudo-controlled emergency stopInformationalAcknowledged - 11/28/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Overpayment refunded in shares instead of base tokens

//

High

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.2 Borrow limit checked in share units allows exceeding base-token cap

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.3 Silent zero-share issuance from small deposits

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.4 Persistent DoS due to large idle-time interest accrual

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.5 Lack of hard cap and unsafe default Interest parameters

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.6 Missing validation on sudo SetInterest allows invalid interest curves

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.7 Division-by-zero on repay when the debt pool is empty

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.8 No sudo-controlled emergency stop

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.