Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 04/29/2026
Date of Engagement: February 26th, 2026 - February 27th, 2026
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
5
Critical
0
High
1
Medium
0
Low
2
Informational
2
Trace Finance engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of their BRLT Solana program beginning on February 26th, 2026, and ending on February 27th, 2026. The security assessment was scoped to the Solana Programs provided in brlt-solana GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
The BRLT (Brazilian Real Token) program is a Solana SPL Token built on the Token-2022 standard that implements a permissioned minting and burning system with role-based access control. The system is designed for regulated fiat-backed stablecoins where a central authority controls issuance, can freeze accounts for compliance, and can permanently remove tokens from blacklisted wallets—all role assignments are mutable and can be renounced by holders themselves.
Halborn was provided 2 days for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the Solana Programs.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were addressed by the Trace Finance team. The main ones were the following:
Ensure users without burner role cannot burn their tokens directly via the native burn instruction.
Restrict the signer of the 'initialize' instruction to be a specific known address.
Validate during the 'initialize' instruction that the provided mint is correctly configured.
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation |
|---|---|---|
| Burn instruction access control can be bypassed | High | Solved - 04/02/2026 |
| Risk of initialization front-running | Low | Solved - 04/26/2026 |
| Insufficient mint account validation | Low | Solved - 04/27/2026 |
| Risk of Admin Access Loss After Role Revocation | Informational | Solved - 02/26/2026 |
| Missing Recipient Validation in Mint Instruction | Informational | Solved - 04/02/2026 |
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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BRLT Solana program
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