Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 03/13/2026
Date of Engagement: February 18th, 2026 - February 25th, 2026
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
2
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
1
Informational
1
TruFin engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their Raydium Vault program beginning on February 18th, 2026 and ending on February 25th, 2026. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repository solana-vaults, commit hashes, and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
The Trufin team is releasing a new version of Raydium Vault Solana program. The program implements a vault that integrates with Raydium's Concentrated Liquidity Market Maker (CLMM) and TruFin's TruSOL liquid staking token. Users deposit SOL, which is split between WSOL and staking for TruSOL, then deployed as liquidity into a Raydium CLMM position. The vault mints proportional share tokens to depositors and manages withdrawals, fee collection, and position management through a set of permissioned and permissionless instructions.
Halborn was provided 6 business days for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the Solana Program.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were addressed by the Trufin team. The main ones were the following:
Move the vault idle balance calculation to after the Raydium CPI in the withdraw instruction to ensure fair non-treasury fee distribution between consecutive withdrawers
Include unclaimed Raydium CLMM trading fees in the total_assets calculation during deposit share pricing to prevent dilution of existing shareholders
Halborn performed a combination of manual review and security testing based on scripts to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:
Research into architecture and purpose.
Differences analysis using GitLens to have a proper view of the differences between the mentioned commits
Graphing out functionality and programs logic/connectivity/functions along with state changes
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
1
Informational
1
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Pre-CPI Idle Balance Calculation Causes Unfair Fee Distribution Between Withdrawers | Low | Solved - 03/09/2026 |
| Share Pricing Excludes Unclaimed Raydium CLMM Fees Leading to Depositor Dilution of Existing Shareholders | Informational | Solved - 03/09/2026 |
//Low
//Informational
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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Solana Vaults
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