Solana Vaults Audit | TruYields | Halborn Audit Reports

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

About this report

Assessment Type

Assurance Assessment

Date of Engagement

February 18th, 2026 - February 25th, 2026

Source Code

solana-vaults-public

solana-vaults-public-80cbcc1d8408e430547eebb0040c2358e26de8cb.zip

Assessed Commit ID

80cbcc1

Severity Breakdown

0Acknowledged
0Risk Accepted
2Solved
2All Findings

Critical0
High0
Medium0
Low1
- 1Solved
Informational1
- 1Solved

Introduction#

TruFin engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their Raydium Vault program beginning on February 18th, 2026 and ending on February 25th, 2026. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repository solana-vaults, commit hashes, and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

The Trufin team is releasing a new version of Raydium Vault Solana program. The program implements a vault that integrates with Raydium's Concentrated Liquidity Market Maker (CLMM) and TruFin's TruSOL liquid staking token. Users deposit SOL, which is split between WSOL and staking for TruSOL, then deployed as liquidity into a Raydium CLMM position. The vault mints proportional share tokens to depositors and manages withdrawals, fee collection, and position management through a set of permissioned and permissionless instructions.

Assessment Summary#

Halborn was provided 6 business days for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

Identify potential security issues within the Solana Program.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were addressed by the Trufin team. The main ones were the following:

Move the vault idle balance calculation to after the Raydium CPI in the withdraw instruction to ensure fair non-treasury fee distribution between consecutive withdrawers
Include unclaimed Raydium CLMM trading fees in the total_assets calculation during deposit share pricing to prevent dilution of existing shareholders

Test Approach and Methodology#

Halborn performed a combination of manual review and security testing based on scripts to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:

Research into architecture and purpose.
Differences analysis using GitLens to have a proper view of the differences between the mentioned commits
Graphing out functionality and programs logic/connectivity/functions along with state changes

Risk Methodology#

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

EXPLOITABILITY METRIC ( $m_e$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A)	1
Attack Origin (AO)	Specific (AO:S)	0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L)	1
	Medium (AC:M)	0.67
	High (AC:H)	0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L)	1
	Medium (AX:M)	0.67
	High (AX:H)	0.33

Exploitability

E

is calculated using the following formula:

$E = \prod m_e$

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

IMPACT METRIC ( $m_I$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)	None (C:N)	0
	Low (C:L)	0.25
	Medium (C:M)	0.5
	High (C:H)	0.75
	Critical (C:C)	1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N)	0
	Low (I:L)	0.25
	Medium (I:M)	0.5
	High (I:H)	0.75
	Critical (I:C)	1
Availability (A)	None (A:N)	0
	Low (A:L)	0.25
	Medium (A:M)	0.5
	High (A:H)	0.75
	Critical (A:C)	1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N)	0
	Low (D:L)	0.25
	Medium (D:M)	0.5
	High (D:H)	0.75
	Critical (D:C)	1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N)	0
	Low (Y:L)	0.25
	Medium (Y:M)	0.5
	High (Y:H)	0.75
	Critical (Y:C)	1

Impact

I

is calculated using the following formula:

$I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}$

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Metrics:

SEVERITY COEFFICIENT ( $C$ )	COEFFICIENT VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N)	1
	Partial (R:P)	0.5
	Full (R:F)	0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C)	1.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Unchanged (S:U)	1

Severity Coefficient

C

is obtained by the following product:

$C = rs$

The Vulnerability Severity Score

S

is obtained by:

$S = min(10, EIC * 10)$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Critical	High	Medium	Low	Informational
9 - 10	7 - 8.9	4.5 - 6.9	2 - 4.4	0 - 1.9

Scope#

(a) Repository:solana-vaults-public

(b) Assessed Commit ID:80cbcc1d8408e430547eebb0040c2358e26de8cb

21 files

raydium-vault / programs / raydium-vault

21 files

src

20 files

instructions

12 files

clmm

5 files

close_position.rs

rust

decrease_liquidity.rs

rust

increase_liquidity.rs

rust

mod.rs

rust

open_position.rs

rust

collect_fees.rs

rust

deposit.rs

rust

initialize.rs

rust

Out-of-Scope:Third party dependencies and economic attacks.

(a) Submitted File: solana-vaults-public-80cbcc1d8408e430547eebb0040c2358e26de8cb.zip

(b) Items in scope:

22 files

solana-vaults-public-80cbcc1d8408e430547eebb0040c2358e26de8cb / raydium-vault / programs / raydium-vault

22 files

src

20 files

instructions

12 files

clmm

5 files

close_position.rs

rust

decrease_liquidity.rs

rust

increase_liquidity.rs

rust

mod.rs

rust

open_position.rs

rust

collect_fees.rs

rust

deposit.rs

rust

initialize.rs

rust

https://github.com/TruFin-io/solana-vaults-public/pull/3/changes/fef1093dd1c44bea81fa8df5182355decd02452a 697bcf981345f667fc43b51be4cbfd102ee7f0be

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

Assessment Summary & Findings Overview#

#	Title	Severity	Score	Status
HAL-01	Pre-CPI Idle Balance Calculation Causes Unfair Fee Distribution Between Withdrawers	Low	3.4	Solved03/09/2026
HAL-02	Share Pricing Excludes Unclaimed Raydium CLMM Fees Leading to Depositor Dilution of Existing Shareholders	Informational	1.7	Solved03/09/2026

Findings & Tech Details#

HAL-01Solved

Pre-CPI Idle Balance Calculation Causes Unfair Fee Distribution Between Withdrawers

Low

3.4AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:MAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:M

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Addressed in:

https://github.com/TruFin-io/solana-vaults-public/pull/3/changes/fef1093dd1c44bea81fa8df5182355decd02452a

HAL-02Solved

Share Pricing Excludes Unclaimed Raydium CLMM Fees Leading to Depositor Dilution of Existing Shareholders

Informational

1.7AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:LAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:L

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Addressed in:

697bcf981345f667fc43b51be4cbfd102ee7f0be

8. Automated Testing#

Disclaimer#

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.