Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated Unknown date
Date of Engagement: July 22nd, 2024 - August 19th, 2024
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
9
Critical
1
High
1
Medium
2
Low
3
Informational
2
Vaultka engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their Waterusdc and Vaultka Solana programs beginning on July 22, 2024, and ending on August 19, 2024. The security assessment was scoped to the Solana Programs provided in vaultkarust GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
The Waterusdc program is a single side lending pool program that allows whitelisted users or other programs to borrow USDC tokens from the lending pool. The Vaultkausdc program is a strategy program allowing users to borrow USDC tokens via the Waterusdc program and gain exposure to the Jupiter's JLP token. The program uses the Pyth oracle in order to fetch current JLP and USDC prices, and also allows users to use leverage up to certain limits to increase market exposure.
Halborn was provided 4 weeks for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the Solana Programs.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified some security concerns that were addressed by Vaultka team. The main ones were the following:
Withdraw fee is transferred to the user instead of the fee vault
Inefficient slippage control
Incorrect token price conversion prevent withdrawal
Incorrect accounts mutability
Only informational issues were currently only acknowledged and not addressed.
Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
- Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
- Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.
- Mapping out possible attack vectors
- Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.
- Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (
cargo audit
- Local anchor testing (
anchor test
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
1
High
1
Medium
2
Low
3
Informational
2
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| WITHDRAW FEE IS TRANSFERRED TO THE USER INSTEAD OF THE FEE VAULT | Critical | Solved - 08/20/2024 |
| INEFFICIENT SLIPPAGE CONTROL | High | Solved - 08/25/2024 |
| INCORRECT ACCOUNTS MUTABILITY | Medium | Solved - 08/22/2024 |
| INCORRECT TOKEN PRICE CONVERSION PREVENTS WITHDRAWAL | Medium | Solved - 08/20/2024 |
| RISK OF OUTDATED PRICE FEED | Low | Solved - 08/20/2024 |
| SET_JLP_PRICE INSTRUCTION WILL ALWAYS FAIL | Low | Solved - 08/20/2024 |
| UNBOUNDED FEES CALCULATION | Low | Solved - 08/20/2024 |
| INABILITY TO CLOSE UNNEEDED ACCOUNTS | Informational | Acknowledged |
| FORMAL ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS | Informational | Acknowledged |
//Critical
//High
//Medium
//Medium
//Low
//Low
//Low
//Informational
//Informational
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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Waterusdc and Vaultka Solana Programs
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