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Xyber Sale Solana Program - Xyber

Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 02/17/2026

Date of Engagement: February 5th, 2026 - February 9th, 2026

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

9

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

1

Low

1

Informational

7

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Xyber engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their xyber-sale program beginning on February 5th, 2026 and ending on February 9th, 2026. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repository xyber-ico-solana, commit hashes, and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.


The Xyber team is releasing a Solana program for conducting an ICO (Initial Coin Offering) of the XYBER token. The program manages the full lifecycle of the token sale, including initialization, round configuration, bucket-based token allocation, SOL and quote asset deposits, deterministic and priceless vesting schedules, token claiming with burn mechanics, and fund withdrawals by the admin.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided 3 business days for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

    • Identify potential security issues within the Solana Program.

    • Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.


In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were addressed by the Xyber team. The main ones were the following:

    • Validate bucket vesting type before accepting deposits or creating deterministic vesting configs to prevent funds lock

    • Replace set_inner with individual field assignments in setup_bucket to preserve accounting state on re-initialization

    • Validate base_period_index bounds in vesting plan setup to prevent panics or silent zero allocations

    • Implement two-step ownership transfer for the multisig role to prevent irreversible loss of program control

    • Validate time parameters in round setup to prevent misconfigured rounds

    • Handle equal claim and burn ratios explicitly in remainder distribution to prevent silent burn bias

    • Validate base_mint against a hardcoded address to prevent configuration of an incorrect ICO token

    • Validate price and exponent parameters in quote mint configuration to prevent temporal denial of service

    • Centralize all PDA seed strings in the constants module to prevent typos and ensure consistency

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual review and security testing based on scripts to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:

    • Research into architecture and purpose.

    • Differences analysis using GitLens to have a proper view of the differences between the mentioned commits

    • Graphing out functionality and programs logic/connectivity/functions along with state changes


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: xyber-ico-solana
(b) Assessed Commit ID: e69420c
(c) Items in scope:
  • programs/xyber-sale/src/lib.rs
  • programs/xyber-sale/src/constants.rs
  • programs/xyber-sale/src/data.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

1

Low

1

Informational

7

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Missing Bucket Vesting Type Validation on Deposit and Deterministic Setup Causes Funds Permanently LockedMediumSolved - 02/09/2026
Unvalidated Bucket Data Overwrites Accounting State on Re-initializationLowSolved - 02/09/2026
Unvalidated Base Period Index in Vesting Plan Causes Panic or Silent Zero AllocationInformationalSolved - 02/11/2026
Missing Two-Step Ownership Transfer for Multisig Role Allows Irreversible Loss of Program ControlInformationalSolved - 02/11/2026
Missing Time Parameter Validation in Round Setup Allows Misconfigured RoundsInformationalSolved - 02/11/2026
Remainder Token Distribution Silently Favors Burn When Ratios Are EqualInformationalSolved - 02/11/2026
Missing Base Mint Address Validation Allows Configuration of Incorrect ICO TokenInformationalSolved - 02/11/2026
Incorrect Parameters in Quote Mint Configuration Might Lead To Temporal DoSInformationalSolved - 02/11/2026
Inconsistent Use of Inline PDA Seed Strings Instead of Centralized ConstantsInformationalSolved - 02/11/2026

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Missing Bucket Vesting Type Validation on Deposit and Deterministic Setup Causes Funds Permanently Locked

//

Medium

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/Xyber-Labs/xyber-ico-solana/commit/6545c33a4e5741fada482556ae74dd373319f87c

7.2 Unvalidated Bucket Data Overwrites Accounting State on Re-initialization

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/Xyber-Labs/xyber-genesis-sale/commit/5f2a952fe837262b59b97cf45c8c7bcdd17d7dea

7.3 Unvalidated Base Period Index in Vesting Plan Causes Panic or Silent Zero Allocation

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/Xyber-Labs/xyber-ico-solana/commit/aa5f9877ef96ee09e0dd76d3a932f0177edaebdd

7.4 Missing Two-Step Ownership Transfer for Multisig Role Allows Irreversible Loss of Program Control

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/Xyber-Labs/xyber-ico-solana/commit/1e7f18993c9ac0063cb24a662b0e139eef8903e6

7.5 Missing Time Parameter Validation in Round Setup Allows Misconfigured Rounds

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/Xyber-Labs/xyber-ico-solana/commit/97309acceef95ecfabf0a48990ff04e12074312c

7.6 Remainder Token Distribution Silently Favors Burn When Ratios Are Equal

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/Xyber-Labs/xyber-ico-solana/commit/dbb2f8967c6fcbad0c3876d233fc51367a075a41

7.7 Missing Base Mint Address Validation Allows Configuration of Incorrect ICO Token

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Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/Xyber-Labs/xyber-ico-solana/commit/f58eb691d25af4a9f2f002b02fe6616bfcf5e0cf

7.8 Incorrect Parameters in Quote Mint Configuration Might Lead To Temporal DoS

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/Xyber-Labs/xyber-ico-solana/commit/ba699b4b44884af52937d908b3afeb5d73a0aa38

7.9 Inconsistent Use of Inline PDA Seed Strings Instead of Centralized Constants

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/Xyber-Labs/xyber-ico-solana/commit/b9bb3dd06d5a7b3b901a406a76b98fc1b52a6250

8. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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Xyber Sale Solana Program

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