Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated Unknown date
Date of Engagement: April 12th, 2024 - April 19th, 2024
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
20
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
8
Informational
12
ZenRockLabs engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on 04-12-2024 and ending on 04-19-2024. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the https://github.com/zenrocklabs/zr-sign GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
Halborn was provided 1 week for the engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were mostly addressed by the Zenrock Labs team.
The main identified issues were:
Response functions can be called during contract's paused state, allowing to continue contract operations.
Lack of match identification between response function caller and recovered address.
Lack of storage verification allows for duplicated public keys.
Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the contracts' solidity code and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into architecture and purpose.
Smart contract manual code review and walk-through.
Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic-related vulnerability classes.
Manual testing with custom scripts (Foundry).
Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions.
External libraries and financial-related attacks.
New features/implementations after/within the remediation commit IDs.
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
8
Informational
12
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Lack of storage verification allows for duplicated public keys | Low | Solved - 05/01/2024 |
| Missing threshold verification for fees | Low | Risk Accepted |
| Lack of input validation for destination chain id may allow for requests to invalid chains | Low | Risk Accepted |
| Response functions can be called during contract's paused state allowing to continue contract operations | Low | Solved - 05/01/2024 |
| Lack of match identification between response functions caller and recovered address | Low | Risk Accepted |
| Missing traceId verification in signature resolve function | Low | Solved - 05/06/2024 |
| Contract may emit multiple resolving events for the same data | Low | Solved - 05/01/2024 |
| Insufficient public key validation | Low | Risk Accepted |
| Improper contract naming conventions in upgradeable OpenZeppelin inheritance | Informational | Solved - 05/01/2024 |
| Missing namespace NatSpec tag for ERC-7201 | Informational | Solved - 05/01/2024 |
| PUSH0 is not supported by all chains | Informational | Solved - 05/01/2024 |
| Transfer with hardcoded gas amount | Informational | Solved - 05/01/2024 |
| Unused `SRC_WALLET_TYPE_ID` constant declaration | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Public functions not called within the contract can be made external | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Lack of verification for config functions input values | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Unnecessary payable modifier in `withdrawFees()` | Informational | Solved - 05/01/2024 |
| Typo in function name | Informational | Solved - 05/01/2024 |
| Misleading error name | Informational | Solved - 05/01/2024 |
| Unnecessary storage access | Informational | Solved - 05/01/2024 |
| Missing initialization function for AccessControl | Informational | Solved - 05/01/2024 |
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Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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