Summary
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
- 1Acknowledged
- 1Risk Accepted
- 4Solved
- 6All Findings
- Critical0
- High1
- 1Solved
- Medium1
- 1Solved
- Low2
- 1Solved
- 1Risk A.
- Informational2
- 1Solved
- 1Ack.
Introduction#
Zenrock engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their modules, beginning on Halborn to conduct a security assessment on the appchain modules, beginning on 08/05/2024 and ending on 09/11/2024. The security assessment was scoped to the sections of code that pertain to the modules. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
Assessment Summary#
Halborn was provided 4 weeks for the engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security experts with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
- Ensure that the Zenrock Chain Modules operate as intended.
- Identify potential security issues with the Zenrock Chain Modules in the Zenrock Chain.
In summary, Halborn identified some security concerns that were mostly addressed by the Zenrock team.
Test Approach and Methodology#
Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the custom modules. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of structures and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
- Research into architecture and purpose.
- Static Analysis of security for scoped repository, and imported functions. (e.g., staticcheck, gosec, unconvert, codeql, ineffassign and semgrep)
- Manual Assessment for discovering security vulnerabilities in the codebase.
- Ensuring the correctness of the codebase.
- Dynamic Analysis of files and modules related to the modules.
Risk Methodology#
4.1 EXPLOITABILITY
Attack Origin (AO):
Attack Cost (AC):
Attack Complexity (AX):
Metrics:
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) | 1 |
| Specific (AO:S) | 0.2 | |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) | 1 |
| Medium (AC:M) | 0.67 | |
| High (AC:H) | 0.33 | |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) | 1 |
| Medium (AX:M) | 0.67 | |
| High (AX:H) | 0.33 |
4.2 IMPACT
Confidentiality (C):
Integrity (I):
Availability (A):
Deposit (D):
Yield (Y):
Metrics:
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) | 0 |
| Low (C:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (C:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (C:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (C:C) | 1 | |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) | 0 |
| Low (I:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (I:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (I:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (I:C) | 1 | |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) | 0 |
| Low (A:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (A:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (A:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (A:C) | 1 | |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) | 0 |
| Low (D:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (D:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (D:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (D:C) | 1 | |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) | 0 |
| Low (Y:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (Y:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (Y:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (Y:C) | 1 |
4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT
Reversibility (R):
Scope (S):
Metrics:
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) | 1 |
| Partial (R:P) | 0.5 | |
| Full (R:F) | 0.25 | |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) | 1.25 |
| Unchanged (S:U) | 1 |
| Critical | High | Medium | Low | Informational |
| 9 - 10 | 7 - 8.9 | 4.5 - 6.9 | 2 - 4.4 | 0 - 1.9 |
Scope#
Assessment Summary & Findings Overview#
# | Title | Severity | Score | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unhandled Error in AddApprover Call Within ApproveAction Function | High | 7.0 | Solved09/09/2024 | |
| Implement Support for ERC-20 transferFrom Method in ParseEthereumTransaction | Medium | 6.3 | Solved09/10/2024 | |
| Implement PartyThreshold Validation in NewKeyring Function | Low | 2.5 | Solved09/09/2024 | |
| Implement Expiration Date Utilization in AddMultiGrant Function | Low | 2.5 | Risk Accepted | |
| Lack of spec on the modules | Informational | 0.0 | Solved09/15/2024 | |
| Open TO-DOs | Informational | 0.0 | Acknowledged |
Findings & Tech Details#
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Disclaimer#
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
