Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 12/10/2025
Date of Engagement: August 29th, 2024 - September 23rd, 2024
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
8
Critical
1
High
2
Medium
1
Low
1
Informational
3
The zkCross team engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on August 29th, 2024, and ending on September 29th, 2024. The security assessment was scoped to the Rust smart contracts (Partisia network) provided in the repository mentioned in Scope section of this report (below), with commit hashes and further details.
Halborn was provided 4 weeks for the engagement, and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were mostly addressed by the zkCross team. The main ones were the following:
Correct the calculation of LP tokens in
liquidity-swap PBC.Add locking mechanism in
swap-router PBC.Properly handle errors in
swap-router PBC.Add slippage protection in
liquidity-swap PBC.Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.
Mapping out possible attack vectors.
Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.
Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (cargo audit).
Local runtime testing (cargo test, proptest).
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
1
High
2
Medium
1
Low
1
Informational
3
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Flawed calculation of LP tokens in `liquidity-swap` PBC | Critical | Solved - 11/24/2024 |
| Unhandled errors leads to loss of funds in `swap-router` PBC | High | Solved - 11/24/2024 |
| Lack of locking mechanism leads to loss of funds in `swap-router` PBC | High | Solved - 12/09/2024 |
| TOC-TOU vulnerability in Swap function in `liquidity-swap` PBC | Medium | Solved - 12/09/2024 |
| Incorrect permission check in `dex-swap-factory` PBC | Low | Solved - 12/09/2024 |
| Inconsistent handling of token pairs in `dex-swap-factory` PBC leads to DoS | Informational | Solved - 12/09/2024 |
| Remove private keys from repository | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/09/2024 |
| Missing gas cost estimation in `swap-router` PBC | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/09/2024 |
//Critical
//High
//High
//Medium
//Low
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
// Download the full report
zkCross - Partisia Contracts - Smart Contract Security Assessment
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