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zkPass Node Vault Contracts - ZKPass

Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 12/26/2025

Date of Engagement: December 3rd, 2025 - December 9th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

10

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

4

Low

2

Informational

4

Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION

ZKPass engaged Halborn to perform a security assessment of their smart contracts starting on December 3rd, 2025 and ending on December 8th, 2025. The assessment scope was limited to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and additional details are available in the Scope section of this report.


The NodeStakingVault and StakingRewards contracts together implement a non-custodial staking, delegation, and reward-distribution system. Users can stake tokens, delegate to nodes, manage lockups and cooldowns, and earn rewards calculated based on effective stake, APY, and multipliers. The Vault handles delegation lifecycle and lockup enforcement, while StakingRewards manages on-chain reward accrual and claims.

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

Halborn was allocated 4 days for this engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineers to conduct a comprehensive review of the smart contracts within scope. The engineers are experts in blockchain and smart contract security, with advanced skills in penetration testing and smart contract exploitation, as well as extensive knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.


The objectives of this assessment are to:

    • Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.

    • Verify that the smart contract functionality operates as intended.


In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of security risks, which were mostly addressed by the ZKPass team. The main recommendations were:

    • Add node activation checks to all increase functions.

    • Cap or reject any lockup extension that results in a total lockup exceeding MAXIMUM_USER_DELEGATE_LOCKUP_DURATION.

    • Update the MAX_BONUS constant in the contract to align with the documented behavior.

    • Implement a mechanism where initiating any unstake begins cooldown for all staked tokens.


3. TEST APPROACH AND METHODOLODY

Halborn conducted a combination of manual code review and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy within the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is crucial for identifying flaws in logic, processes, and implementation, automated testing enhances coverage of smart contracts and quickly detects deviations from established security best practices.


The following phases and associated tools were employed throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the platform's architecture, purpose and use.

    • Manual code review and walkthrough of smart contracts to identify any logical issues.

    • Comprehensive assessment of the safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions within scope that could lead to arithmetic-related vulnerabilities.

    • Local testing using custom scripts (Foundry).

    • Fork testing against main networks (Foundry).

    • Static security analysis of scoped contracts, and imported functions (Slither).


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: zkPass-Node-Vault-Contract
(b) Assessed Commit ID: abde9b2
(c) Items in scope:
  • src/AVNManager.sol
  • src/NodeSlasher.sol
  • src/NodeStakingVault.sol
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: External dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

4

Low

2

Informational

4

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Missing Node Activation Check in increaseDelegateAmount Allows Delegation to Deactivated NodesMediumSolved - 12/21/2025
Lockup Extension via increaseDelegateLockup() Breaks Maximum Lockup InvariantMediumSolved - 12/21/2025
Incorrect MAX_BONUS Constant Causes 6x Multiplier Instead of 1.5xMediumSolved - 12/22/2025
Users Can Exploit Cooldown Period to Earn Extra Rewards by Delaying Second initiateDelegateUnstake CallMediumSolved - 12/21/2025
Users Can Accidentally Reset Cooldown Period by Calling initiateDelegateUnstake Instead of unstakeLowSolved - 12/21/2025
Missing Maximum Lockup Duration Check in increaseDelegateLockupLowSolved - 12/21/2025
Unused onlySlasher Modifier and Unused penaltyTreasury SetterInformationalAcknowledged - 12/22/2025
Redundant Minimum Stake Duration Check in Unstake LogicInformationalSolved - 12/21/2025
Incorrect Error MessageInformationalSolved - 12/21/2025
Centralization RiskInformationalAcknowledged - 12/22/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Missing Node Activation Check in increaseDelegateAmount Allows Delegation to Deactivated Nodes

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Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/zkPass-DAO/zkPass-Node-Vault-Contract/commit/c8803fe1e8946d9e46cf8624c6c98c9b142e8acd

7.2 Lockup Extension via increaseDelegateLockup() Breaks Maximum Lockup Invariant

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Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/zkPass-DAO/zkPass-Node-Vault-Contract/commit/9ae5cb129dae197440e9aa30af264f82ca5ef2a5

7.3 Incorrect MAX_BONUS Constant Causes 6x Multiplier Instead of 1.5x

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Medium

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/zkPass-DAO/zkPass-Node-Vault-Contract/commit/6fe9d2c2804b304e468889726e864587e1d26a28

7.4 Users Can Exploit Cooldown Period to Earn Extra Rewards by Delaying Second initiateDelegateUnstake Call

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Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/zkPass-DAO/zkPass-Node-Vault-Contract/commit/2a4c73255ef0b28d76189ad1c034aae98358efa0

7.5 Users Can Accidentally Reset Cooldown Period by Calling initiateDelegateUnstake Instead of unstake

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Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/zkPass-DAO/zkPass-Node-Vault-Contract/commit/7d8871c84416da5ec474527e1bb9c0ddcd7dc62c

7.6 Missing Maximum Lockup Duration Check in increaseDelegateLockup

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Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/zkPass-DAO/zkPass-Node-Vault-Contract/commit/9ae5cb129dae197440e9aa30af264f82ca5ef2a5

7.7 Unused onlySlasher Modifier and Unused penaltyTreasury Setter

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Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.8 Redundant Minimum Stake Duration Check in Unstake Logic

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Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/zkPass-DAO/zkPass-Node-Vault-Contract/commit/45970b4b44eb28317466ba7296fc3979b95bf576

7.9 Incorrect Error Message

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Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/zkPass-DAO/zkPass-Node-Vault-Contract/commit/45970b4b44eb28317466ba7296fc3979b95bf576

7.10 Centralization Risk

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Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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zkPass Node Vault Contracts

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